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Summary 	
 
The	 study	 analyses	 how	 the	 European	 Union	 can	 resist	 the	 temptation	 of	 postponing	 ambitious	
climate	 action	 after	 the	 end	 of	 the	 current	 economic	 uncertainty	 and	 social	 alarms	 that	 fuel	 self-
isolation	reflexes.	It	tries	and	demonstrates	that	not	engaging	ambitious	climate	policies	now	would	
deprive	Europe	of	a	lever	for	a	new	growth	regime,	socially	and	geographically	inclusive.	
This	 demonstration	 retrieves	 many	 well-known	 advocacy	 elements	 in	 favor	 of	 ‘green	 growth’	
(negative	 cost	 options,	 deployment	 of	 carbon	 free	 innovation,	 or	 the	 double	 dividends	 of	 carbon	
taxes)	 and	 resets	 them	 within	 a	 new	 mental	 map	 of	 the	 economics	 of	 climate	 change	 that	
incorporates	 a	 surprising	 absentee	 of	 the	 prevailing	mental	map,	 finance.	 In	 this	mental	map	 new	
opportunities	of	co-dividend	of	climate	policies	can	primarily	be	explored	to	fill	the	gap	between	the	
propensity	 to	save	and	the	propensity	 to	 invest	which	 is	one	of	 the	major	 fault	 lines	of	 the	current	
economic	growth	engine.	
A	set	of	numerical	simulations	based	on	a	general	equilibrium	model	for	2nd	best	economies	shows	
why	 Europe,	 starting	 from	 a	 stagnation	 scenario	 ‘à	 la	 japonaise’,	 cannot	 recover	 a	 high	 and	
sustainable	 growth	 trajectory	 even	 by	 mobilizing	 optimistic	 technological	 assumptions	 about	 low	
carbon	options,	a	redirection	of	transportation	investments	and	climate	friendly	fiscal	reforms.	These	
simulations	demonstrate	that	the	main	deadlock	comes	from	the	technical	and	behavioral	inertia	that	
slow	down	the	deployment	of	the	benefits	of	such	measures.	
It	 then	 shows	 how	 this	 deadlock	 can	 be	 overcome	 by	 financial	 instruments	 apt	 to	 reduce	 the	 risk	
weighted	capital	cost	of	low	carbon	investments	and	to	indicate	where	the	savings	should	go	instead	
of	seeking	refuge	in	liquid	financial	products	or	real	estates.	It	concludes	suggesting	some	avenues	for	
reframing	 the	European	climate	policies	and	 their	alignment	with	overall	policies	aiming	at	calming	
down	internal	tensions	in	Europe	and	at	fostering	a	new	growth	regime.	
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Introduction 
	
The	 European	 Union	 seems	 caught	 in	 a	 double	 bind.	 It	 pretends	 to	 exert	 a	 leadership	 in	 climate	
policies	after	the	Paris	Agreement	while	 it	 faces	 internal	distrusts	about	 its	capacity	to	secure	well-
paid	jobs,	to	sustain	a	reasonable	level	of	social	security	and	to	address	the	‘immigration’	challenge.	
Together	with	 increasing	 divisive	 lines	 between	 former	Western	 and	 Eastern	 Europe,	 Brexit	 is	 one	
symptom	of	a	temptation	of	self-isolation	that	is	not	conducive	to	ambitious	climate	policies.	
This	 double	 bind	might	 last	 in	 a	 context	where	 the	 recent	 recovery	 from	 the	 2008	 crisis	might	 be	
fragilized	by	the	continuing	exacerbation	of	inequalities	(World	Bank	2016;	Dablas-Norris	et	al.	2015),	
by	diverging	 trends	 in	 the	economies	of	 the	European	countries	 (Aglietta	2014)	and	by	 the	risks	of	
‘secular	stagnation’	pinpointed	by	prominent	economists	(Lewis	et	al.	2014;	Blanchard	et	al.	2016).	
One	 logical	 temptation	 is	 then	 to	 postpone	 ambitious	 climate	 action	 after	 the	 end	 of	 the	 current	
economic	 uncertainty	 and	 social	 alarms.	 Given	 the	 pace	 at	 which	 the	 available	 budget	 of	 carbon	
emissions	shrinks	to	meet	the	2°C	target	(UNEP	2017),	this	comes	to	a	‘climate	resigned	attitude’	that	
admits	the	scientific	alerts,	contrary	to	the	‘climate	sceptic	attitude’,	but	considers	de	facto	that	the	
battle	is	lost.	This	study	turns	the	question	upside	down.	It	argues	that,	whatever	the	judgment	about	
at	what	 level	we	will	ultimately	stabilize	global	warming,	not	engaging	the	climate	fight	now	would	
deprive	Europe	of	a	lever	to	launch	a	new	growth	regime,	socially	and	geographically	inclusive	and	to	
shape	the	future	of	the	economic	globalization	process.	
This	 demonstration	will	 inevitably	 retrieve	many	well-known	 advocacy	 elements	 in	 favor	 of	 ‘green	
growth’	even	though	these	elements	(negative	cost	options,	deployment	of	carbon	free	innovation,	
or	the	double	dividends	of	carbon	taxes)	often	fail	to	convince	‘climate	resigned’	and	generate	a	‘too	
good	to	be	true’	 intellectual	reflex.	It	will	reset	them	within	a	new	mental	map	of	the	economics	of	
climate	change	that	incorporates	a	surprising	absentee	of	the	prevailing	mental	map,	finance,	which	
is	both	one	driving	force	of	the	modern	world	economy	and	a	key	policy	domain.	
The	 dominant	 economic	 framing	 of	 climate	 policies	 pictures	 indeed	 a	 world	 where	 sectors	 or	
countries	 are	 ‘emissions	 abatement	 factories’	 using	 an	 evolving	 mix	 of	 existing	 and	 future	
technologies.	In	this	world,	the	optimal	response	is	a	‘where	and	when’	flexibility:	to	abate	emissions	
at	each	point	in	time	where	it	is	cheaper	to	do	so	and	follow	an	abatement	trajectory	that	does	not	
impose	premature	costs	on	current	generations	that	could	be	avoided	by	abating	more	later	thanks	
to	cheaper	new	techniques.	
However,	 for	 reasons	 of	 macroeconomic	 efficiency	 and	 of	 social	 acceptability,	 the	 pace	 at	 which	
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carbon	prices	can	increase	in	every	country	depends	upon	the	pace	at	which	government	will	be	able	
to	 insert	them	in	reforms	of	the	fiscal	system	and	of	the	public	policies.	This	pace	will	 likely	be	too	
slow	 to	 meet	 the	 2°C	 target.	 In	 the	 dominant	 economic	 mental	 map	 described	 above,	 a	 unique	
carbon	price	throughout	the	world	comes	to	bypass	this	constraint.	However,	it	will	maximize	global	
welfare	 only	 if	 large	 transfers	 across	 countries	 are	 operated	 to	 compensate	 for	 its	 adverse	
distributive	 effects1.	 In	 addition	 to	 exacerbating	 the	 self-isolation	 political	 reflexes,	 this	 option	
confronts	 a	 double	 difficulty,	 assessing	 these	 transfers	 given	 the	 magnitude	 of	 the	 general	
equilibrium	effects	of	significant	carbon	prices	and	securing	that	they	will	not	generate	pure	windfall	
benefits	(Waisman	et	al.	2013).	
A	solution	space	can	be	found	to	align	climate	policies	with	short	term	economic	policies	and	long-
term	development	policies	only	if	climate	policies	can	help	economies	to	function	closer	to	their	full	
potential	 and	 can	 generate	 a	 carbon	 saving	 technical	 change	 without	 loss	 in	 overall	 productivity.	
Historically,	 proposals	 in	 this	 direction	 focused	 on	 reducing	 the	 energy	 efficiency	 gap,	 conducting	
climate	friendly	fiscal	reforms	or	reducing	subsidies	to	fossil	fuel	consumption.	However,	the	double-
dividend	to	be	expected	from	these	policy	parameters	is	limited	by	the	vested	interests	they	threaten	
and	the	distributional	issues	they	raise.	Although	they	remain	valid,	new	opportunities	of	co-dividend	
of	 climate	 policies	 have	 to	 be	 explored	 that	were	 neglected	 so	 far	 and	 they	 have	 to	 be	 searched	
within	 some	 of	 the	 major	 fault	 lines	 of	 the	 current	 economic	 growth	 engine.	 One	 is	 the	 low	
development	 of	 domestic	 infrastructures	 (IMF	 2013)	 often	 generated	 by	 the	 ‘export	 to	 grow’	
imperative	 of	 the	 current	 globalization	 pattern	 (Rajan	 2010);	 another	 one	 is	 the	 gap	 between	 the	
propensity	 to	 save	 and	 the	 propensity	 to	 invest	 (Summers	 2015;	 Blanchard	 2016).	 This	 study	 will	
consider	only	indirectly	the	former	and	place	the	focus	on	the	latter.		
This	gap	relates	indeed	basically	to	the	increase	of	the	risk	component	of	decisions	despite	the	low	
level	 of	 interest	 rates	 of	 central	 banks:	 small	 and	 medium	 enterprises	 with	 a	 difficult	 access	 to	
finance,	 large	 corporates	 under	 a	 ‘shareholder	 business	 regimes’,	 households	 concerned	 by	 the	
weakness	of	 the	social	 safety	net.	This	 creates	a	Buridan	Donkey	syndrome	where	 the	cash	holder	
does	not	know	where	to	invest	productively2.		
Climate	finance	can	then	come	into	play	to	break	this	syndrome	by	indicating	where	the	‘cash’	should	
go	 instead	of	seeking	refuge	 in	 liquid	financial	products	or	real	estates.	The	 introduction	of	climate	
finance	 does	 not	 disqualify	 old	 debates	 about	 the	 respective	 role	 of	 prices	 and	 regulation	 in	 the	
redirection	of	 technical	change	or	about	 the	use	of	carbon	revenues	 to	minimize	 the	social	 cost	of	
climate	 policies	 or	 even	 to	 turn	 them	 into	 a	 gain.	 	 But	 it	 changes	 substantially	 the	 terms	 of	 this	
                                                
1 That is why article 136 of the Paris Agreement that carbon pricing “applies to non-party entities, and is not binding upon 
countries that are parties to the UNFCCC.”  
2 The Buridan Donkey is an old legend where, in front of a bucket of water and a pile of oat, the donkey educated in a too 
rationalistic way dies because it hesitates too much between drinking first and eating first  
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debate,	 including	 because	 it	 helps	 overcome	 some	 of	 the	 short-term	 barriers	 to	 climate	 policies,	
thanks	 to	 luring	 the	 risk	 waited	 capital	 cost	 of	 low-carbon	 investments	 of	 which	 importance	 is	
convincingly	highlighted	by	Hirth	and	Steckel	(1997).	To	avoid	presenting	mistakenly	climate	finance	
as	a	novel	magic	bullet	in	the	same	way	as	carbon	taxes	or	R&D	funding	have	been	often	presented	in	
the	past,	we	will	we	proceed	in	three	steps.	
	
First,	a	description	of	 the	 IMACLIM-R	model	utilized	 in	this	report	will	be	used	to	specify	the	many	
types	 of	 ‘sub-optimalities’	 at	 play	 in	 a	 ‘second	 best	 economy’	 and	 to	 define	 ‘virtual’	 scenarios	
embarking	increasingly	rich	‘policy	packages’,	starting	from	pure	command	and	control	policies	in	the	
energy	 sector	 and	 adding	 successively	 infrastructure	 policies,	 tax	 reforms	 and	 financial	 devices.	 A	
second	 section	 will	 demonstrate	 how	 climate	 policies	 might	 generate	 a	 significant	 burden	 on	 an	
already	 fragile	 European	Union.	A	 third	 section	will	 show	how	 the	 interplays	of	policy	 instruments	
within	 the	 increasingly	 rich	packages	previously	defined	give	 levers	 to	 transform	this	burden	 into	a	
gain	and	help	Europe	escape	the	risk	of	a	stagnation	phase	‘à	la	japonaise’	(IMF	2016).		
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1 Scenarios for economies below their production 
frontier  
	
A	 dominant	 practice	 for	 assessing	 the	 economic	 implications	 of	 climate	 policies	 is	 to	 compare	 a	
reference	and	a	policy	 scenario	using	a	general	equilibrium	model	 that	 represents	how	economies	
situated	 on	 equilibrated	 growth	 pathway	 behave	 with	 or	 without	 carbon	 constraints,	 given	
information	 on	 technical	 potentials	 provided	 by	 production	 functions	 or	 various	 forms	 of	 coupling	
with	engineering-based	models.	This	approach	is	legitimate	for	picturing	various	long	run	equilibria.	
Its	 limits,	 for	detecting	how	 to	align	 climate	policies	 and	overall	macroeconomic	and	development	
policies	is	its	failure	in	describing	the	transition	from	the	current	suboptimal	state	of	the	economy	to	
the	projected	long-term	growth	pathways.	As	stated	by	the	IPCC:		
	
“Most	models	use	a	global	least-cost	approach	to	mitigation	portfolios	and	with	universal	emissions	
trading,	 assuming	 transparent	 markets,	 no	 transaction	 cost,	 and	 thus	 perfect	 implementation	 of	
mitigation	measures	throughout	the	21st	century	(IPCC	AR4	WGIII	SPM,	Box	3)”.	
	
This	is	why	the	IMACLIM-R	model	used	in	this	study	comes	back	to	the	original	General	Equilibrium	
framework	 in	 the	 Johansen’s	 sense	 (Johansen	 1963,	 Chenery	 and	 Bowles	 1971)	 where	 economic	
interdependencies	are	described	without	presuming	the	economy	to	be	on	a	‘first-best’	equilibrium3	
and	located	on	its	production	frontier.	The	reader	will	find	more	detailed	descriptions	of	the	motives	
and	 technical	 characteristics	 of	 the	 IMACLIM-R	 world	 model	 in	 Sassi	 et	 al	 (2009),	 Waisman	 et	 al	
(2012b)	and	Bibas	et	al	(2015).	We	summarize	here	its	main	features	to	understand	how	it	captures	
some	 of	 the	 mechanisms	 needed	 for	 turning	 pessimistic	 predictions	 about	 the	 economic	
consequences	of	a	low	carbon	transition	into	an	optimistic	vision	of	the	capacity	of	this	transition	to	
help	ending	the	current	economic	and	political	uncertainty.		
	
1.1 Modeling second best economies 
	
IMACLIM-R	world	is	a	hybrid	recursive	general	equilibrium	model	that	projects	the	world	economy,	
split	into	12	regions	and	12	sectors,	on	an	annual	basis	up	to	the	end	of	the	century.	Europe	is	one	of	
this	region	(EU	27	plus	Macedonia,	Norway	and	Switzerland).	
	
                                                
3	About	 the	history	of	 the	misunderstandings	due	 to	 the	 fusion	between	 this	 tradition	and	 the	 tradition	of	 the	applied	
general	equilibrium	models	after	Scarf,	see	Mitra-Kahn	(2008).	
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1.1.1 A hybrid modelling framework 
Like	 any	 general	 equilibrium	 model,	 IMACLIM-R	 represents	 the	 interactions	 between	 sectors	 and	
countries	 over	 time	 through	 the	 clearing	 of	 commodities	markets.	 Its	main	 difference	 is	 that	 this	
market	clearing	does	not	secure	a	full	employment	of	installed	production	capacity	and	labor.	This	is	
due	to	dropping	the	perfect	foresight	assumption.	A	reluctance	to	drop	this	assumption	comes	from	
the	 disadvantage	 of	 indefiniteness	 (Solow	 2000)	 given	 the	 many	 options	 available	 to	 represent	
expectations	and	from	the	tendency	towards	overshoot	and	collapse	of	models	with	disequilibrium.	
Confronted	 to	 the	 trade-off	 between	 ‘definiteness	 and	 convenience’	 (Solow	 2000)	most	modellers	
prefer	the	definiteness	of	intertemporal	optimisation:	‘clairvoyance	is	an	implausible	assumption,	but	
myopia	seems	even	worse’	 (Manne-Rutherford	1994).	The	response	of	 IMACLIM-R	 is	to	control	the	
arbitrariness	 of	 behavioral	 assumptions	 and	 their	 technical	 realism.	 It	 incorporates	 in	 a	 consistent	
way,	 in	 a	 multi-sectoral	 growth	 model	 information	 coming	 from	 bottom-up	 engineering-based	
models	and	from	experts’	judgement	about	the	behavioral	specifics	of	sectors.	
	
This	information	is	obviously	controversial	but	represents	a	hedge	against	the	trap	of	combinatorial	
uncertainty.	 Indeed,	 IMACLIM-R	 is	 based	 on	 hybrid	matrixes	 in	money	metric	 values	 and	 physical	
quantities4	 linked	 by	 a	 price	 vector	 that	 secures	 consistent	 description	 of	 the	money	 and	 physical	
flows	in	an	economy	(Sands	et	al.	2005).	This	dual	description	guarantees	that	the	projected	economy	
is	supported	by	a	realistic	technical	background	and,	conversely,	that	any	projected	technical	system	
corresponds	 to	 realistic	 economic	 flows	 and	 consistent	 sets	 of	 relative	 prices5.	 Explicit	 physical	
indicators	allow	a	 rigorous	 incorporation	of	 sector-based	 information	about	how	 final	demand	and	
technical	systems	are	transformed	by	economic	incentives,	especially	for	very	large	departures	from	
the	reference	scenario.		
	
This	 representation	gives	up	 the	conventional	KLE	or	KLEM	production	 functions	 that,	after	Berndt	
and	Wood	 (1975)	 and	 Jorgenson	 (1981),	 were	 admitted	 to	mimic	 the	 set	 of	 technical	 constraints	
impinging	on	 an	 economy.	Regardless	 of	 questions	 about	 their	 empirical	 robustness6,	 their	 limit	 is	
that,	 whatever	 their	 mathematical	 form,	 they	 are	 calibrated	 on	 cost-shares	 data	 through	 the	
Shepard's	lemma	which	is	a	simple	case	of	application	of	the	envelope	theorem.	The	domain	within	
which	this	theorem	provides	a	reliable	approximation	of	technical	sets	is	limited	by	(i)	the	assumption	
that	economic	values	result	from	an	optimal	response	of	decision-makers	to	the	price	vector	at	each	
                                                
4	 These	 are	 real	 physical	 indicators	 (mtep)	 passenger/kilometer,	 ton/kilometer,	 square	 meters	 or	 surrogated	 physical	
indicators	for	the	energy	intensive	industries	and	composite	goods.	
5	On	the	hybrid	models	see	the	special	issue	of	the	Energy	Journal	(Hourcade	&	Jaccard	ed.	2006)	
6	After	assessing	one	thousand	econometric	works	on	the	capital-energy	substitution,	Frondel	&	Schmidt	(2002)	conclude	
that	“inferences	obtained	from	previous	empirical	analyses	appear	to	be	largely	an	artefact	of	cost	shares	and	have	little	
to	do	with	statistical	inference	about	technology	relationship”.		
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point	 in	 time	given	perfect	 foresight	of	 the	 future	prices	 trajectories	 and	 (ii)	 the	 lack	of	 realism	of	
constant	substitution	elasticities	to	describe	the	space	of	technical	possibilities	over	short	and	long-
term	time	horizons.		
	
In	 the	 absence	 of	 mathematical	 functions	 suited	 to	 cover	 large	 departures	 from	 the	 reference	
equilibrium	and	flexible	enough	to	encompass	all	the	scenarios	resulting	from	the	interplay	between	
consumption	 styles,	 technologies	 and	 localization	 patterns	 (Hourcade	 1993),	 IMACLIM-R	 generates	
the	 production	 functions	 underpinning	 the	 economies	 at	 each	 point	 in	 time	 through	 a	 recursive	
exchange	of	information	between:	
	
• An	annual	 static	 equilibrium	 in	 the	 strict	meaning	of	 accounting	 equilibrium	not	 of	 optimal	
equilibrium:	the	production	function	 is	Leontief	with	 fixed	equipment	stocks	and	 intensity	of	 labor,	
energy	 and	 other	 intermediary	 inputs,	 but	 where	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 adapt	 the	 utilization	 rate	 of	
production	capacities.	Solving	this	equilibrium	at	“t”	provides	a	snapshot	of	the	economy	at	this	date:	
a	 set	of	 information	about	 relative	prices,	 the	structure	of	 final	demand,	 the	share	of	 this	demand	
addressed	 to	 the	 domestic	 production	 sectors,	 the	 employment	 level	 and	 the	 profitability	 of	 each	
sector,		
	
• Dynamic	modules	 that	combine	trends	of	potential	growth	 (demography	and	general	 factor	
productivity)	and	sectoral	models	that	describe	investments	behaviors,	the	dynamics	of	capital	stocks	
and	 the	 evolution	 of	 technologies	 (power	 generation,	 buildings,	 transportation	 infrastructures,	
energy	efficiency).	These	modules	take	as	inputs	the	economic	values	of	the	previous	static	equilibria,	
assess	the	reaction	of	technical	systems	and	send	this	 information	back	to	the	static	module	 in	the	
form	of	new	input-output	coefficients	to	calculate	the	t+1	equilibrium.	
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Fig.	1:	An	iterative	dialogue	«	top-down	/	bottom-up	»	
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1.2 A (sub-optimal) static equilibrium in physical and money flows 
In	the	IMACLIM	static	equilibrium,	domestic	and	international	markets	for	all	goods	are	cleared	by	a	
unique	set	of	relative	prices	that	depend	on	agents’	behaviors	on	the	demand	and	supply	sides.	The	
calculation	 of	 this	 equilibrium	 determines	 relative	 prices,	 wages,	 labor,	 quantities	 of	 goods	 and	
services,	value	flows.	In	each	region,	the	demand	for	each	good	comes	from	household	consumption,	
government	consumption,	investment	and	intermediate	uses	from	other	production	sectors.		
	
Consumers’	final	demand	results	from	a	utility	maximization	program	of	a	representative	consumer	
that	has	three	distinctive	features:	
	
• Energy	 commodities	 are	 production	 factors	 of	 mobility	 and	 housing	 services	 and	 are	 not	
directly	 included	 in	 the	 utility	 function.	 This	 allows	 for	making	 a	 clear	 distinction	 between	 energy	
efficiency	and	the	evolution	of	consumption	patterns	in	the	decoupling	between	energy	consumption	
and	growth.		
• The	 link	 between	 mobility	 services	 and	 energy	 demand	 encompasses	 the	 availability	 and	
efficiency	 of	 four	 transport	 modes:	 terrestrial	 public	 transport,	 air	 transport,	 private	 vehicles	 and	
non-motorized.	 Due	 to	 differences	 in	 amenities	 delivered	 by	 each	 mode	 and	 in	 specific	 local	
conditions,	the	transport	modes	are	imperfect	substitutes	and	IMACLIM-R	nests	them	in	a	constant	
elasticity	of	substitution	function.	
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• Households	make	decisions	under	 two	budget	constraints:	 their	 income	budget	 (the	sum	of	
wages,	dividends	and	public	transfers)	and	a	‘travel-time	budget’.	This	budget	is	justified	by	empirical	
findings	 (Zahavi	 and	 Talvitie	 1980)	 showing	 the	 average	 daily	 travel	 time	 of	 households	 in	 a	 large	
panel	of	cities	remains	constant	over	decades.	 It	allows	for	representing	the	rebound	effects	of	the	
mobility	demand	in	case	of	lower	costs	of	vehicles	with	a	higher	energy	efficiency.	
In	 the	 static	 equilibrium,	 producers	 operate	 under	 short-run	 constraints	 of	 (i)	 fixed	 input-output	
coefficients	and	 (ii)	a	 fixed	maximal	production	capacity,	defined	as	 the	maximum	 level	of	physical	
output	achievable	with	the	installed	capacity	generated	by	previous	choices.		
Then	the	only	margin	of	freedom	of	consumers	and	producers	at	a	given	point	in	time	is	to	adjust	the	
utilization	rate	of	their	equipment	according	to	the	prevailing	market	conditions	which	might	differ	
from	the	expectations	that	guided	the	previous	choices.	This	means	that	the	consumption	basket	is	
not	fully	optimal	and	that	the	production	factors	are	not	always	fully	operated.		
Overall	demand	can	be	provided	by	either	domestic	production	or	imports.	For	non-energy	sectors,	
the	 model	 uses	 the	 conventional	 Armington	 specification	 (Armington	 1969)	 which	 assumes	 that	
domestic	and	imported	products	are	non-perfect	substitutes.	This	allows	for	representing	markets	in	
which	 domestically	 produced	 goods	 keep	 a	 share	 of	 domestic	markets	 even	 though	 their	 price	 is	
higher	than	the	world	price	and	various	exporters	co-exist	on	the	same	market	even	with	different	
prices.	While	ensuring	the	closure	of	international	markets	in	value	terms,	this	specification	does	not	
allow	for	summing	international	trade	flows	in	physical	terms.	This	is	not	a	drawback	for	“composite	
goods”,	where	quantity	units	are	not	used	in	the	analysis	of	the	economy-energy-climate	 interface,	
but	this	is	not	compatible	with	the	need	of	tracking	energy	balances	in	physical	units.	Therefore,	for	
energy	goods,	the	model	uses	a	formula	whereby	the	share	of	the	domestic	and	imported	goods	is	
function	of	the	domestic	production	prices	relative	to	the	international	prices.	
The	most	important	closure	rule	for	describing	trade	flows	in	the	model	is	an	exogenous	assumption	
about	the	allowed	trade	deficit/surplus	of	trade	balances	or	each	country.	The	model	assumes	that	
the	payment	balance	of	every	 country	 is	 then	equilibrated	by	 capital	exports/imports.	 This	 closure	
rule	has	a	critical	impact	on	the	wage	setting	in	each	country:	the	higher	the	allowed	trade	deficit,	the	
lower	is	the	international	competitiveness	constraint	on	the	country	and	the	higher	the	wages.	
1.1.3 Endogenous growth dynamics: between potential and real growth 
The	 growth	 engine	 described	 in	 IMACLIM–R	 is	 fueled,	 like	 in	 any	 growth	 model,	 by	 investment	
dynamics	given	a	production	 frontier.	Contrary	 to	a	 Solow	 type	model,	 this	possibility	 space	 is	not	
given	 by	 a	 production	 function	 and	 an	 exogenous	 technical	 progress.	 It	 is	 given	 by	 the	 interplay	
between:	
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• The	potential	growth	reachable	at	each	point	in	time	which	is	the	product	of	the	working-age	
population	and	of	the	overall	labor	productivity	given	technical	constraints	at	the	sectorial	level	that	
govern	 the	 productivity	 of	 energy	 and	 of	 other	 intermediate	 inputs.	 Overall	 labor	 productivity	 is	
function	 of	 a	 catch-up	 dynamics	 of	 the	 US	 labor	 productivity	 and	 this	 catch-up	 is	 function	 of	
cumulated	 investments	 though	 endogenous	 learning	 by	 doing	 processes.	 The	 change	 in	 technical	
constraints	 depends	 upon	 the	 cumulated	 investment	 of	 each	 of	 the	 technologies	 represented	 in	
sectorial	 models.	 Given	 explicit	 technical	 asymptotes	 (see	 Fig.	 1)	 the	 cost	 of	 each	 technology	
decreases	in	function	of	the	cumulated	investment	allocated	to	it.	
	
• Decision	–	making	under	non-perfect	 foresight7.	 Investments	are	 triggered	 in	a	sector	when	
meeting	 the	 final	 demand	 addressed	 to	 this	 sector	 forces	 a	 too	 high	 utilization	 rate	 of	 installed	
capacities.	 Decreasing	 returns	 then	 enter	 into	 play	 with	 higher	 labor	 costs	 and	 intermediary	
consumption	 (Corrado	 and	 Mattey	 1997).	 Under	 the	 constraints	 of	 technical	 inertia	 (the	 new	
capacities	are	a	small	share	of	total	capacity)	the	model	describes,	in	case	of	mis-expectation	(of	oil	
prices	or	of	the	final	demand	to	a	sector)	adjustment	costs	which	generate	a	gap	between	potential	
growth	and	real	growth.		
 
In	 a	 nutshell,	 the	 working	 of	 the	 growth	 engine	 in	 IMACLIM-R	 is	 governed	 by	 the	 quality	 of	
expectations	 and/or	 the	 stability	 of	 key	 economic	 parameters	 (the	 oil	 prices	 in	 this	 study).	 Its	
direction	 is	 governed	 by	 trends	 in	 development	 patterns	 (consumption,	 technology,	 spatial	
development)	and	by	the	capacity	of	policy	signals	to	alter	these	patterns.	Its	rate	is	function	of	the	
level	of	investment	decisions	and	of	their	quality,	their	capacity	to	remove	technical	constraints	that	
could	slow	down	a	given	development	path	(fossil	fuel	reserves	for	carbon	intensive	pathways,	costs	
of	 alternative	 energies	 for	 low	 carbon	 pathways).	 This	 modelling	 structure	 can	 then	 capture	 how	
stabilizing	 the	 expectations	 through	well	 designed	 climate	 policies	 can	 be	 a	major	 lever	 to	 reduce	
some	structural	fault	lines	of	our	economies.	
	
1.2 IMACLIM calibration: a backcasting exercise 
The	 capacity	 of	models	 describing	non-equilibrated	 growth	pathways	 to	 deliver	 useful	 information	
depends	upon	their	capacity	to	reproduce,	at	 least	roughly,	past	ups	and	downs	of	the	economies.	
This	is	why	the	calibration	of	IMACLIM–R	was	made	through	a	back-casting	exercise	reproducing	the	
                                                
7In	most	cases,	expectations	for	demand	take	into	account	demand	growth	in	the	past	three	years	and	prolong	that	trend.	
The	expectations	of	demand	encompass	a	fifteen	years’	period	in	the	energy	sectors.	In	the	central	case,	most	agents	are	
assumed	myopic	for	prices	(i.e.	current	prices	will	apply	in	the	future).	When	the	carbon	price	is	clearly	announced	by	the	
government,	the	carbon	price	can	be	perfectly	anticipated.		
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observed	trends	between	2001	and	2013.	For	 the	2001	base	year	we	modified	the	set	of	balanced	
social	accounting	matrices	(SAM)	of	the	world	economy	provided	by	the	GTAP-6	data	set	(Dimaranan	
2006)	 to	 make	 them	 fully	 compatible	 with	 2001	 IEA	 energy	 balances	 (in	 Mtoe)	 and	 data	 on	
passengers’	mobility	(in	passenger-km)	from	Schafer	and	Victor	(2000).	In	a	second	step,	the	dynamic	
equations	were	calibrated	so	that	the	calculated	trajectory	for	economic	growth	and	energy	are	not	
very	far	from	past	trends	and	from	the	2013	data.		
	
This	exercise	had	to	confront	the	existence	of	many	shocks	over	this	time	period:	the	shock	exchange	
rates	between	Euro	and	$,	the	real	estate	bubble	in	some	countries,	the	‘oil	shock’,	the	financial	crisis	
and	 the	 ‘counter	 oil	 shock’8.	 We	 checked	 that	 it	 was	 possible	 to	 represent	 the	 gap	 between	 the	
calculated	 steady	 growth	 and	 real	 trends	 through	 a	 very	 few	 exogenous	 and	 controllable	
assumptions.	This	was	possible	because,	most	of	the	relations	between	the	energy	sector	and	growth	
being	endogenized	in	IMACLIM-R,	the	degrees	of	freedom	to	calibrate	the	dynamic	equations	on	the	
observed	 trends	are	 limited.	 The	arbitrariness	 in	 the	 selection	of	parameters	 is	 constrained	by	 the	
fact	that	any	assumption	about	one	parameter	impacts	the	others	through	the	double	constraint	of	
consistency	 of	 flows	 both	 in	 value	 and	 prices	 at	 each	 point	 in	 time.	 An	 assumption	 can	 be	 thus	
rejected	 if	 it	 leads	 to	 attribute	 a	 non-plausible	 value	 to	 one	 of	 these	 parameters.	 The	 calibration	
process	we	carried	out	for	the	version	of	IMACLIM-R	utilized	in	this	report	can	be	judged	successful	
because:	
• It	was	proved	possible	to	fit	the	model	to	the	real	trends	after	the	‘external	shock’	of	the	2008	
financial	crisis	by	modifying	only	the	‘catch	up’	trend	in	the	potential	productivity	of	labor.		Although	
the	IMACLIM	growth	engine	does	not	endogenize	the	productivity	effect	of	the	financial	cycles,	this	
makes	possible	to	build	economic	recovery	scenarios	on	the	basis	of	a	simple	assumption	about	the	
date	of	a	full	return	to	the	pre-2008	productivity	trends	in	the	absence	of	new	external	shocks	due	to	
energy	tensions.		
• The	model	 succeeded	 to	 reproduce	 endogenously	 trajectories	 of	 oil	 prices	 that	 are	 not	 far	
away	 from	 real	 trends.	 The	model	 did	 not	 capture	 the	 ‘apex	 of	 the	 peak’	 around	 the	 100$/bl	 on	
average	 in	 2008	 but	 anticipated	 that	 this	 level	was	 not	 sustainable	 and	 it	 ‘predicted’	 a	 decline.	 It	
could	even	anticipate	the	low	oil	prices	over	the	past	four	years	in	case	of	‘market	flooding	policy’	by	
the	OPEC	(Waisman	et	al.	2012b)	and	can	generate	the	return	of	an	upward	trend	under	assumption	
                                                
8	Symmetrically,	the	econometrically-based	models	oversell	their	capacity	to	capture	real	trends:	total-factor-productivity	
calculations	requires	not	only	that	market	prices	can	serve	as	a	rough-and-ready	approximation	of	marginal	products,	but	
that	aggregation	does	not	hopelessly	distort	 these	relationships	 […]	over-interpretation	 is	 the	endemic	econometric	vice’	
(Solow	2008)).	 First	 there	 is	no	historical	 period,	 excepted	 the	50s	and	 the	60s	 in	 the	Western	World,	with	decades	of	
steady	 growth	 without	 on	 which	 it	 would	 be	 possible	 to	 capture	 stable	 economic	 relationships.	 Second	 there	 is	 no	
certainty	that	revealed	relations	will	resist	the	impact	of	structural	changes	in	the	economies,	 including	changes	in	their	
governance.	 The	more	 the	models	 are	 disaggregated	 the	more	 important	 is	 this	 stability	 problem	 and	 a	 high	 level	 of	
aggregation	 is	 needed	 for	 econometrically	 models	 at	 cost	 of	 a	 weak	 representation	 of	 energy,	 transport	 and	 building	
sectors	which	are	key	for	a	low	carbon	transition.	
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of	modification	of	the	implicit	strategic	choices	in	the	OPEC.	
	
Fig.	2:		GDP	growth	rates	after	the	crisis	without	exogenous	shocks	(%)	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
• Third,	 the	 differences	 between	 the	 calculated	 final	 energy	 demand	 and	 real	 trends	 are	 not	
significant,	 meaning	 that	 apparent	 energy-price	 and	 energy-income	 elasticities	 approximate	 real	
behaviors	 at	 the	 global	 level.	 There	 are	 higher	 differences	 in	 the	 detail	 of	 the	 energy	 balances	
recalculated	 by	 IMACLIM-R	 and	 the	 IEA	 record.	 But	 they	 do	 not	 matter	 for	 the	 macroeconomic	
analysis	conducted	here	below.	Most	of	 the	differences	are	due	to	second	order	problems	 like	 the	
absence	of	energy	from	waste	(for	heating	systems)	in	our	model	which	does	not	change	the	overall	
economic	dynamics.		
	
1.3 A stagflation reference trend confronted to two oil prices trajectories 
The	post-2016	growth	 rates	 in	 the	EU	up	 to	2035	will	depend	upon	both	parameters	out	of	direct	
control	 of	 the	 EU	 and	 of	 parameters	 alterable	 by	 policy	 decisions.	 Amongst	 the	 exogenous	
parameters,	 the	 most	 critical	 are	 the	 hypothesis	 about	 a	 possible	 secular	 stagnation	 (economic	
doldrums	 in	 the	 Western	 World,	 duration	 of	 the	 current	 economic	 slowdown	 in	 emerging	
economies),	the	US	monetary	policy,	the	risks	of	currency	war	and	the	future	of	oil	prices.	
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In	the	following	numerical	exercises,	all	parameters	other	than	oil	prices	are	kept	constant.		By	2035,	
we	calculate	average	growth	rate	of	2.3%	which	is	the	lower	band	of	the	World	Bank	scenarios.	
	
This	 restriction	of	 the	 analysis	 to	 a	 single	world	 scenario	 allows	 for	 focusing	on	how	 the	 EU	 could	
transform	the	GHG	emissions	objectives	into	a	lever	to	avoid	a	‘Japanese	stagnation’	profile.	Before	
the	 crisis,	 the	 ‘natural’	 labor	 productivity	 trend	 in	 the	 EU	was	 supposed	 to	 catch	 up	 the	US	 labor	
productivity	level	about	2040	and	then	follow	a	1.7%	per	year	growth	rate	historically	observed	in	the	
advanced	economies	since	the	19th	century.	To	picture	the	current	uncertain	context	we	assume	that,	
in	the	absence	of	policy	choices,	the	European	catch-up	will	take	place	in	2060	only.	The	issue	is	then	
to	understand	what	articulation	between	climate	policies	and	other	public	policies	is	apt	to	improve	
this	 growth	 engine	 by	 accelerating	 the	 catch-up	 process	 and	 narrowing	 the	 gap	 between	 the	
potential	and	real	growth.	
	
1.3.1 Oil prices: geologically and geopolitically constrained trajectories 
The	decline	of	oil	prices	down	to	35$/bbl	last	year	is	largely	due	a	specific	geopolitical	context.	It	can	
be	analyzed	as	an	implicit	oil	market	flooding	strategy	of	the	OPEC	resulting	from	an	economic	trade-
off,	giving	 less	weigh	to	the	short-term	losses	 in	export	revenues	and	more	weigh	to	the	 long-term	
benefits	 of	 higher	 oil	 rents	 generated	 by	 the	 locking	 of	 oil	 importing	 economies	 in	 intensive	
development	pathways	(Waisman	et	al.	2012b).		This	strategic	choice	is	consistent	with	a	low	public	
discount	 rate,	 capturing	 the	 capacity	 of	 governments	 to	 sustain	 long	 term	 strategies.	 However,	 as	
suggested	by	the	recent	 increase	of	oil	prices,	both	the	necessity	of	 increasing	the	revenues	of	 the	
exportation	of	 oil	 and	 gas	 revenues	 and	 the	will	 of	 discouraging	 the	oil	 importing	 country	 to	 raise	
carbon	prices	force	not	to	stick	to	a	univocal	conjecture	about	the	geopolitical	context	of	the	oil	and	
gas	markets.	We	thus	retained	two	polar	assumptions:	
	
• A	 continued	 market	 flooding	 strategy	 aiming	 at	 a	 price	 of	 40	 $/bbl	 to	 discourage	 the	
deployment	of	alternative	fossil	fuel	supply	in	the	short	run	(including	investments	to	export	US	shale	
oil	and	gas)		
• A	 return	 to	 restrictions	 in	 oil	 supply	 to	 reap	 the	 short-term	 rents	 of	 oil	markets	 through	 a	
price	objective	of	120$/bbl.	This	means	lower	investments	and	oil&gas	supply	and	under	exploitation	
of	production	capacities.	
	
These	strategies	confront	both	geological	constraints	(the	available	reserves	for	given	price	levels	and	
the	 ‘Hubert	 curves’	 for	 the	depletion	of	 oil	 and	 gas	 fields)	 and	 technical	 constraints	 (the	 inertia	 in	
deploying	 both	 new	 oils	 and	 gas	 capacities	 and	 alternative	 technologies.	 The	 hybrid	 nature	 of	
IMACLIM-R	 allows	 for	 representing	 these	 geological	 constraints	 and	 for	 calculating	 the	 oil	 price	
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trajectories	corresponding	to	the	two	geopolitical	strategies:	
	
• In	a	market	flooding	scenario,	IMACLIM-R	does	not	find	a	possibility	to	maintain	prices	below	
50$	 for	a	 long	time	and	rather	envisage	a	smooth	 increasing	trend	between	60	and	80$,	a	plateau	
below	100	$/bbl	 in	2040	and	skyrocketing	prices	up	 to	160$	 in	2050	during	 the	 last	decade	of	 the	
period.	
• Under	 a	 ‘restriction	 scenario’,	 IMACLIM-R	 predicts	 a	 steep	 increase	 of	 oil	 prices	 beyond	
100$/bbl	after	2020.	This	increase	is	followed	by	an	upward	trend	leading	to	prices	over	200$/bbl	in	
2030,	 level	 at	 which	 they	 stabilize	 as	 a	 feedback	 of	 demand	 and	 supply-side	 responses	 in	 the	 oil	
importing	countries	and	to	a	steady	decline	at	the	end	of	the	period	(which	continues	after	2050).	
	
Fig.	3	-	Oil	prices	in	reference	scenarios	($/bbl)	
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1.3.2 Oil prices trajectories, a significant impact on GDP growth  
	
Confronted	with	different	levels	of	oil	prices	(that	govern	gas	and	coal	prices)	the	growth	engine	we	
just	describe	does	not	deliver	the	same	growth	rates	in	a	scenario	without	climate	policies	(Reference	
scenario	R)9:	0.95%	over	2010	–	2035	in	case	of	low	oil	prices	instead	of	0.78%	with	high	prices,	1.33%	
instead	of	1.11%	between	2020	and	2035,	and	2.23%	instead	of	2.16%	at	the	end	of	the	period	(Table	
1).	This	is	the	logical	consequence	of	the	drain	imposed	by	imports	of	fossil	energy	on	the	European	
economy:	higher	exports	of	non-energy	 goods	are	needed	 to	 stabilize	 the	European	 trade	balance	
which	implies	lower	wages	and	leads	to	a	lower	internal	demand.	
	
Even	 the	 growth	 recovery	 after	 2030	 would	 not	 succeed	 to	 stabilize	 unemployment	 in	 the	 EU15:	
accessing	countries	demand	a	fast-catch-up	dynamics	and	growth	rates	above	3%	or	4%.	An	average	
EU	growth	rate	below	2%	per	year	would	thus	 imply	a	growth	rate	 in	the	EU	15	significantly	below	
1.5%	which	would	result	into	average	unemployment	levels	undermining	the	social	stability	in	the	EU,	
especially	in	regions	with	a	lower	growth	than	the	European	average.		
Table	1:	GDP	MER	Real	-	Growth	rates	(%)		
	 High	oil	prices	(HOP)	 Low	oil	prices	(LOP)	
2010-2035	 0.98	 1.13	
2015-2020	 0.65	 0.97	
2020-2035	 1.11	 1.33	
2030-2035	 2.16	 2.23	
 
1.3.3 Four scenarios to disentangle the specific role of policy variables  
To	understand	how	a	low	carbon	transition	could	generate	a	sustainable	economic	recovery	in	the	
EU,	it	matters	to	disentangle	the	interplays	between	the	macroeconomic	mechanisms	activated	by	
various	 policy	 tools.	We	 then	 present	 here	 below	 a	 succession	 of	 policy	 scenarios	 leading	 to	 a	
decarbonization	profile	in	line	with	the	claimed	EU	objective	of	reducing	its	CO2	emissions	by	half	
in	 2035	 compared	 to	 1990,	 and	 by	 4	 in	 2050.	 As	 shown	 in	 Table	 2,	 each	 of	 these	 scenarios	
correspond	to	increasingly	rich	policy	packages.	
None	 of	 these	 scenarios	 can	 be	 read	 as	 realistic.	 They	 are	 numerical	 experiments	 on	 virtual	
                                                
9	About	the	influence	of	oil	prices	on	economic	growth	see:	Hamilton	(2008),	Davis	and	Haltiwanger	(2001).	
19 
 
scenarios	helping	 to	disentangle	 the	 specific	 role	of	 each	option,	 alone	and	 in	 combination	with	
others.	 For	 policy	 debates	 their	 comparison	matters	more	 than	 the	 absolute	 value	we	 find	 and,	
because	 the	most	 critical	 issue	 is	 about	 the	 triggering	 phase,	 the	 time	 profile	 of	 the	 economic	
consequences	matters	more	than	the	cumulated	effects	over	the	period.	
In	 scenario	 V0,	 Europe	 adopts	 climate	 centric	 policies	 in	 the	 energy	 sector	 on	 the	 supply	 and	
demand	 side.	 An	 emission	 constraint	 is	 imposed	 on	 the	 European	 economy	 and	 its	 resulting	
shadow	price	is	transformed	into	a	carbon	tax	imposed	in	all	sectors.	The	revenues	of	this	tax	are	
given	 back	 to	 taxpayers	 in	 a	 lump	 sum	 way.	 The	 ‘scarcity	 rents’,	 the	 differences	 between	 the	
marginal	abatement	costs	and	the	average	abatement	costs,	remain	in	each	industry.	
Scenario	 V1	 adds	 to	 V0	 scenario	 transport	 infrastructure	 policies	 to	 modify	 the	 dynamics	 of	
passenger	transport	and	freight.	In	V0	scenario	infrastructures	decisions	rest	on	the	same	rationale	
as	 other	 production	 capacities:	 when	 infrastructures	 approach	 saturation,	 their	 expected	
profitability	is	enhanced.	Investments	are	triggered	to	expand	the	network	and	this	reinforces	the	
modal	 shares	 of	 road	 and	 air	 transportation.	 In	 V1	 scenario	we	 assume	 that	 national	 and	 local	
public	authorities,	for	objectives	other	than	climate	goals,	 invest	more	on	urban	forms	conducive	
to	 ‘soft	 modes’	 and	 incite	 a	 decoupling	 between	 production	 and	 the	 freight	 transport.	 This	
mobilizes	a	complex	set	of	parameters	that	govern	 localization	patterns	(industrial	specialization,	
trade-offs	between	supply	security	and	‘just	in	time’	production,	urban	and	land-use	policies,	real	
estate	 pricing)	 that	 are	 not	 described	 in	 IMACLIM-R.	 Their	 result	 is	 simply	 translated	 through	 a	
ceiling	on	road	infrastructures.	
Scenario	V2	adds	 to	V1	scenario	a	 recycling	of	 the	 revenues	of	 the	carbon	 tax	 into	 lowering	 the	
social	 contributions	 paid	 directly	 or	 indirectly	 by	 labor.	 In	 the	 V0	 and	 V1	 scenarios	 variants,	
production	costs	 increase	beyond	 the	mere	carbon	price	because	higher	energy	costs	propagate	
through	 the	 interplay	 between	 sectoral	 production	 and	 demand.	 This	 propagation	 effect	 is	
counteracted	in	V2	scenario	by	the	decrease	of	labor	costs.	
	
Scenario	V3	adds	to	the	V2	scenario	policy	packages	financial	devices	meant	to	reduce	the	specific	
risks	involved	in	low-carbon	investments	and	incite	to	invest	in	projects	with	longer	return	periods.	
These	policies	reduce	the	risk-weighted	capital	cost	of	low	carbon	energies	and	energy	efficiency.	
In	addition	to	V3	scenario	 incorporates	the	development	of	 labor	and	vocational	training	policies	
that	accelerate	the	adaptation	of	manpower	to	the	new	jobs	and	maximize	the	share	of	 the	 low	
carbon	activities	satisfied	by	European	production.	
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Table	2:	Scenarios	definition	
R	 Reference	Scenario	with	two	variants	(High	Oil	Prices	(HOP)	and	Low	Oil	Prices	(LOP))	
V0	 Climate	Centric	Policies	(CCP)	with	two	variants	(HOP	and	LOP)	
V1	 CCP	plus	Infrastructure	policies	(CCPI)	with	two	variants	(HOP	and	LOP)	
V2	 CCPI	plus	carbon	taxation	(CCPIT)	with	two	variants	(HOP	and	LOP)		
V3	 CCPIT	plus	Financial	Devices	with	two	variants	(HOP	and	LOP)	
 
2 Climate-centric policies: the reasons for significant 
costs  
In	this	section,	we	consider	climate	policies	like	most	modeling	studies	conducted	at	the	margin	of	a	
reference	scenario	independently	from	any	other	objective,	even	though	it	is	possible	to	assess,	ex-
post,	their	co-benefits	for	example	in	terms	of	energy	security	or	local	pollution	(Clarke	et	al.	2014).	
In	 consistency	 with	 established	 economic	 wisdom10	 and	 because	 most	 models	 assume	 least	 cost	
planning	 under	 perfect	 foresight11,	 they	 find	 that	 a	 uniform	 carbon	 price	 is	 necessary	 to	minimize	
costs	of	reaching	a	given	decarbonization	target.	
	
Even	 if	 it	 is	 a	 virtual	 scenario	 with	 a	 low	 probability	 of	 realization,	 it	 provides	 a	 clear	 and	 useful	
benchmark	 to	 assess	 other	 policy	 scenarios.	 It	 gives	 a	 pivotal	 role	 to	 a	 shadow	 carbon	 pricing	
imposed	 to	 all	 economic	 sectors	 through	 various	 channels:	 explicit	 and	 ex-ante	 carbon	 pricing	
through	 taxes,	 explicit	 and	 ex-post	 carbon	 pricing	 through	 carbon	 trading,	 implicit	 carbon	 pricing	
through	 standards,	 norms,	 procurement	 contracts	 adopted	 by	 public	 agencies	 or	 notional	 carbon	
prices	used	by	enterprises	for	the	internal	management.	
IMACLIM-R	 introduces	 the	 link	 between	 non-price	 policies	 and	 carbon	 pricing	 through	 the	
mechanism	pictured	in	Fig.	4	with	an	asymptote	giving	the	best	technological	performance	attainable	
                                                
10	 This	 shared	wisdom	 is	 supported	by	 theory	only	 to	 the	extent	 that	 compensatory	 transfers	 secure	 that	 the	marginal	
welfare	 losses	 or	 gains	 are	 equated	 amongst	 individuals	 and	 countries.	 Otherwise	 differentiated	 prices	 ‘à	 la	 Lindhall’	
should	be	imposed	in	invert	proportion	of	the	income	levels	(Chichilnisky	et	al.	2000)	
11	The	‘perfect	expectation’	hypothesis	is	useful	for	designing	long-term	equilibria,	but	it	 ignores	the	anxiety	of	decision-
makers	 generated	 by	 the	 interplay	 between	 uncertainty	 and	 inertia	 in	 technical	 systems	 and	 institutions	 (Hourcade	&	
Crassous	2008).	
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at	a	given	point	time.	For	a	given	asymptote	the	energy	prices	act	as	an	accelerator	of	the	diffusion	of	
this	technology	(here,	the	convergence	towards	the	asymptote	performance	will	be	lower	in	the	p1	
case	than	in	the	p2	case).	
	
Fig.	4:	Representation	of	non-price	policies	in	IMACLIM-R	
				
	
This	asymptote	can	be	moved	by	non-price	mechanisms	such	as	norms	and	standards.	This	does	not	
constitute	 a	 free-lunch	 because,	 although	 they	 have	 a	 lower	 leveraged	 cost,	 low	 carbon	 intensive	
technologies	imply	higher	investments	costs	and	crowd-out	other	investments	which	slows	down	the	
learning	by	doing	process	and	productivity	in	other	sectors.	
	
2.1 The rationale for high implicit carbon prices 
Table	3	displays	the	 level	of	carbon	prices	required	to	achieve	the	decarbonization	objective	under	
assumptions	of	low	or	high	oil	prices	in	the	V0	scenario.	The	reader	can	be	surprised	by	carbon	prices	
far	 higher	 than	 those	 often	 circulated	 in	 public	 debates,	 for	 instance	 in	 the	 report	 of	 the	 High	
Commission	on	Carbon	Prices	(Stern	and	Stiglitz	2017)12.	However,	these	figures	are	well	within	the	
range	of	magnitude	obtained	by	the	IPCC	in	2030	(30-400$/tCO2)	(Clarke	et	al.	2014).	Between	2030	
and	2050,	the	IPCC	prices	increase	sharply	(70-300$/tCO2)	and	so	do	our	prices	after	2035.	It	is	true	
however	 that	 our	 price	 trends	 lay	 in	 the	 upper	 range	 of	 the	 IPCC	 price	 corridors.	 This	 is	 because	
IMACLIM-R	 captures	 the	 interplay	 between	 imperfect	 expectations	 behaviors	 and	 the	 inertia	 of	
capital	 stocks	and	 lifestyles.	Very	high	prices	are	 thus	needed	over	 the	 short	 and	medium	 term	 to	
alter	the	behaviors	of	economic	agents	if,	like	in	the	V0	scenario,	carbon	prices	are	only	policy	tool.	
                                                
12 Note that the corridor of carbon prices for 2030 (US$50–100/tCO2 by 2030) mentioned in the report to achieve the Paris 
Agreement Target does not consider the uncertainty of oil prices.  
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Table	3:	Carbon	prices	for	V0	scenario	($/tCO2)	
	
	
	
Fig.	5:	Range	of	carbon	prices	in	AR5	scenarios	($/tCO2)	
	
	
Unsurprisingly,	higher	carbon	prices	are	needed	in	the	low	oil	prices	(LOP)	variant	of	the	VO	scenario	
for	achieving	the	same	emission	target.	The	difference	is	huge	over	the	two	first	periods	with	carbon	
prices	6.5	times	and	5.9	times	higher	in	the	LOP	variant	than	in	the	HOP	variant.	In	the	latter	indeed,	
high	 oil	 prices	 do	 part	 of	 the	 ‘decarbonization	 job’	 for	 a	 given	 emissions	 profile.	 A	 difference	 of	
40$/bbl	 corresponds	 to	 about	 108$/tCO2	 and	 starting	 from	 the	 HOP	 variant	 as	 a	 benchmark,	 the	
amounts	of	abatement	required	are	far	lower	than	starting	from	a	LOP	variant	up	to	2025.			
	 High	oil	prices	(HOP)	 Low	oil	prices	(LOP)	
2015-2020	 26	 170	
2020-2025	 49	 288	
2025-2030	 132	 248	
2030-2035	 320	 461	
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This	has	non-negligible	implication	for	the	short	term	sectoral	dynamics	(Fig.	6).	Taking	a	HOP	variant	
as	a	benchmark,	the	amounts	of	abatement	over	the	first	period	(2020)	increase	from	20%	to	34%	in	
the	energy	supply	when	passing	to	a	LOP	variant,	from	7%	to	16%	in	the	households	sectors	and	from	
7%	to	21%	 in	 the	 transportation	sector.	This	 tripling	of	effort	 in	 the	 latter	sector	 is	due	 to	 the	 fact	
that,	under	the	LOP	variant,	there	is	a	very	little	slowdown	of	mobility	demand.	A	very	high	level	of	
carbon	tax	is	thus	immediately	needed	to	de-carbonize	transportation	activities.	This	high	carbon	tax	
in	 turn	 forces	other	 sectors	 to	make	more	efforts	 in	particular	 in	 the	 industry	 sector	which	has	 to	
abate	its	emissions	by	15%	in	2020.		Industry	is	almost	unaffected	by	the	low	level	of	carbon	price	in	
the	HOP	variant.			
	
Interestingly,	thanks	to	the	very	drastic	rise	in	carbon	tax	to	meet	the	2020	target	for	the	LOP	variant,	
the	 constraint	 appears	 slightly	 relaxed	 in	 2025.	 Indeed,	 the	 carbon	 tax	decreases	 from	288	 to	248	
$/tCO2	 (Table	 3).	 Therefore,	 between	 2020	 and	 2030,	 emissions	 in	 the	 transport	 sectors	 show	 a	
rebound	(Fig.	6).	
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Fig.	6	Carbon	abatement	by	sector	in	V0	scenario	(grey	line	for	low	oil	prices	(LOP)	variant,	dark	line	
for	high	oil	prices	(HOP)	variant)	(%)	
	
 
	
The	 plausibility	 of	 so	 high	 carbon	 prices	 is	 obviously	 questionable.	 The	 increase	 of	 households’	
budget	 dedicated	 to	 energy	 and	 transport	 (Table	 5)	 raises	 the	 question	 of	 the	 relative	 political	
acceptability	of	 implicit	carbon	costs	and	explicit	carbon	taxes.	The	first	reflex	 is	 to	consider	that	
the	political	acceptability	of	the	former	will	be	higher.	But,	beyond	a	certain	level,	the	real	costs	are	
perceived	and	this	generates	a	political	opposition	under	the	overall	feeling	that	governments	did	
not	tell	 the	truth13.	A	carbon	tax	allows,	as	discussed	below,	for	 lowering	the	propagation	of	the	
                                                
13For	instance,	feed-in	tariffs	for	wind	and	solar	power	plants	ranging	from	60	c$/kWh	to	180	c$/kWh	corresponds	to	60	to	
540	$/tCO2.	
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‘hidden	 costs’	 of	 a	 large-scale	 deployment	 of	 command	 and	 control	 measures	 throughout	 the	
economic	 system	 and	 for	 opening	 an	 explicit	 discussion	 about	 the	 recycling	 of	 the	 revenues	 of	
carbon	prices.		
	
Table	4:	Share	of	households’	budget	dedicated	to	energy	and	transport	(%)	
	 High	oil	prices	(HOP)	 Low	oil	prices	(LOP)	
	 R	 V0	 R	 V0	
2015	 13.2%	 13.5%	 11.9%	 12.5%	
2020	 14.7%	 15.2%	 12.4%	 19.7%	
2025	 15.4%	 17.1%	 12.5%	 16.6%	
2030	 15.7%	 17.7%	 12.3%	 15.2%	
2035	 15.0%	 18.5%	 11.6%	 16.7%	
 
2.2 From carbon prices to adverse macroeconomic impacts 
	
In	both	all	prices	variants,	the	V0	scenario	results	in	lower	GDP	growth	than	in	the	reference	scenario	
R	at	every	time	period	(Table	5).	This	is	unsurprising	because,	in	the	absence	of	companion	policy	to	
offset	 this	 mechanism,	 higher	 energy	 costs	 propagate	 throughout	 all	 sectors	 and	 result	 in	 higher	
production	costs	 (4	to	5%	increase	for	the	heavy	 industry	 in	2035)	and	higher	selling	prices	of	 final	
goods.	 Since	 international	 competition	 constrains	 the	 possibility	 of	 higher	wages	 to	 guarantee	 the	
purchasing	 power	 of	 households	 (Table	 6),	 the	 decrease	 of	 real	 wages	 results	 into	 a	 lower	
households’	demand.	Combined	with	lower	market	shares	on	international	markets	caused	by	losses	
of	 international	 competitiveness,	 this	 mechanism	 lowers	 the	 demand	 addressed	 to	 the	 European	
industry.		
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Table	5:	GDP	MER	Real	-	Growth	rates	in	%	and	in	percentage	points	from	the	Reference	scenario	R	
	
	 High	oil	prices	 Low	oil	prices	
	 R	 V0	 R	 V0	
2010-2035	 0.78	 0.52	[-0.26]	 0.95	 0.62	[-0.33]	
2015-2020	 0.65	 0.57	[-0.08]	 0.97	 -0.83	[-1.80]	
2020-2030	 1.11	 0.86	[-0.25]	 1.33	 1.81	[+0.48]	
2030-2035	 2.16	 1.51	[-0.65]	 2.23	 1.57	[-0.66]	
.	
Table	6	-	Purchasing	power	of	wages:	index	1	in	2001	and	decrease	from	the	Reference	scenario	R	
(%)	
	
	 High	oil	prices	 Low	oil	prices	
	 R	 V0	 R	 V0	
2015	 1.15	 1.14	[-0.9%]	 1.2	 1.18	[-1.7%]	
2020	 1.16	 1.14	[-1.7%]	 1.25	 1.01	[-19.2%]	
2025	 1.2	 1.15	[-4.2%]	 1.33	 1.16	[-12.8%]	
2030	 1.26	 1.18	[-6.3%]	 1.42	 1.28	[-9.9%]	
2035	 1.42	 1.24	[-12.7%]	 1.61	 1.34	[-16.8%]	
	
This	 lower	 economic	 growth,	 combined	with	 the	 crowding	 out	 of	 investments	 other	 than	 the	 low	
carbon	 ones	 -	 which	 represents	 a	 28%	 increase	 of	 energy-related	 investments	 on	 the	 supply	 and	
demand	 side	 -	 results	 into	 a	 lower	 rate	 of	 increase	 of	 global	 productivity	 and	 in	 an	 increase	 of	
unemployment	which	is	significant	after	2025	(+10%),	reaching	+31%	in	2035	(Table	12).		
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Within	this	overall	picture	it	is	worth	noting	that,	even	though	the	GDP	losses	are	higher	in	the	LOP	
variant	 (comparing	 the	 LOP	 variant	with	 and	without	 climate	 policy),	 the	GDP	 attained	 in	 the	 LOP	
variant	of	V0	scenario	is,	over	the	period,	4.4%	higher	than	in	a	HOP	variant	of	V0	and	only	2%	lower	
than	in	the	HOP	variant	of	the	reference	scenario	R.	This	confirms	that	climate	policies	hedge	against	
the	 economic	 costs	 of	 the	 volatility	 of	 oil	 prices	 due	 to	 sudden	 transfers	 to	 oil&gas	 exporting	
countries	 (Rozenberg	 et	 al.	 2010).	 The	 underlying	 mechanism	 is	 that,	 in	 the	 LOP	 variant	 of	 V0	
scenario,	a	higher	carbon	tax	allows	for	retaining	a	higher	part	of	the	oil	rent	and	use	it	domestically.	
	
However,	this	positive	conclusion	is	untrue	at	first	period	because	of	the	inertia	of	capital	stocks	and	
of	behavioral	routines.	The	higher	macroeconomic	costs	at	first	period	in	a	LOP	context	come	from	
the	households’	difficulty	to	adapt	quickly	enough	their	end-use	equipment	and	behaviors	to	a	rise	of	
energy	prices	 that	 is	 not	offset	quickly	 enough	by	 the	decarbonization	of	 energy	of	 transportation	
systems.	The	purchasing	power	of	wages	is	then	cut	by	24%	which	has	an	obvious	depressing	effect	
of	the	final	demand	and	growth	(Table	18).	
	
The	role	of	inertia	then	vanishes	along	with	the	penetration	of	low	carbon	equipment	and	V0	returns	
to	positive	growth	rates	 (Tables	5).	The	strong	adaptation	carried	out	over	the	five	 first	years	even	
allows	for	growth	rates	above	the	reference	between	2020	and	2030	in	LOP	variant:	an	economy	now	
strongly	adapted	 to	a	high	prices	of	 fossil	 fuels	 is	more	easily	 to	 the	peak	of	oil	 prices	 that	occurs	
during	this	time	period	than	in	the	Reference	scenario	R.	This	creates	a	form	of	rebound	effect	which	
has	to	be	overcompensated,	after	2030,	by	skyrocketing	carbon	prices	(from	248	to	461	$/tCO2).	
	
Table	7	–	GDP	per	capita	(k$)	(in	R,	V0	scenarios	for	LOP	and	HOP	variants)	
	
	 High	oil	prices	 Low	oil	prices	
	 R	 V0	 R	 V0	
2015	 22.8	 22.72	 23.29	 23.11	
2020	 23.23	 23.06	 24.1	 21.87	
2025	 24.39	 23.86	 25.63	 24.07	
2030	 25.5	 24.71	 27.04	 25.72	
2035	 28.28	 26.54	 30.09	 27.72	
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3 A European green investment trigger scenario 
	
We	now	try	to	design	progressively	an	alternative	scenario	based	on	the	mainstreaming	of	climate	
policies	within	policy	packages	 adopted	 in	 search	of	 a	more	 stable	 growth	and	a	more	 inclusive	
development	in	a	globalized	economy.	For	simplicity	sake,	the	modelling	exercise	still	assumes	the	
level	of	carbon	prices	to	be	the	same	throughout	Europe.	The	major	difference	with	the	previous	
V0	 scenario	 is	 that	 climate	 centric	measures	 leading	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	 carbon	 price	 (at	 least	
implicit)	are	not	the	only	policy	tool.		
	
The	 intellectual	 challenge	 is	 that	 the	 resulting	policy-package	will	be	 composed	of	 very	different	
layers	of	measures	and	that,	when	demonstrating	that	it	could	turn	the	burden	of	climate	policies	
into	a	gain,	this	might	appear	as	resulting	from	‘magic	trick’.	To	avoid	this	risk,	we	proceed	in	three	
steps	to	isolate	the	specific	impact	of	each	layer:	
	
(i) mainstreaming	of	climate	objectives	in	structural	change	policies	
(ii) deployment	of	carbon	based	fiscal	reforms	
(iii) reforms	of	the	financial	intermediation	system	
	
3.1 Mainstreaming climate objectives in structural change 
policies 
One	challenge	for	the	European	societies	is	to	find	a	way	to	secure	an	inclusive	development	despite	
the	 limits	 of	 redistributive	 policies.	 If	 their	 development	 pattern	 generates	 a	 high	 degree	of	 social	
dualism,	increasing	public	transfers	needed	to	compensate	for	this	trend	results	into	a	higher	burden	
either	on	productive	activities	or	on	middle-high	income	classes	thus	provoking	a	‘taxpayer	fatigue’.	
In	 this	 Green	 Transition	 Scenario	 (V1),	 we	 assume	 two	 sets	 of	 changes	 to	 reorient	 the	 EU	
development	pattern	into	a	more	inclusive	way:		
	
• Densification	of	the	EU	production	fabric	and	development	of	human	capital:	the	low	carbon	
transition	mobilizes	activities	which	are	mostly	 ‘sedentary’	 in	 the	sense	 that	 they	are	developed	 in	
local	specific	situations	(e.g.:	a	railway	system,	refurbishment	programs).	It	can	thus	support	a	more	
‘inward	oriented’	 industrialization	by	developing	markets	 less	exposed	to	 international	competition	
through	 wages.	 The	 magnitude	 of	 this	 potential	 depends	 upon	 a)	 the	 availability	 of	 appropriate	
skilled	manpower14	and	b)	 the	reinforcement,	at	all	 levels,	of	a	cooperation	between	corporations,	
                                                
14	The	unavailability	of	appropriate	skilled	workers	 is	 for	example	one	of	 the	major	constraints	 limiting	the	pace	of	 the	
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middle-size	 and	 small	 enterprises	 so	 that	 most	 of	 the	 segments	 of	 the	 value	 chain	 are	 produced	
domestically.	To	capture	the	impacts	of	these	parameters,	we	correlated,	in	our	numerical	exercises,	
the	share	of	the	sedentary	activities	(with	zero	price	elasticity	to	foreign	products)	with	the	amount	
of	energy-related	investments15	and	we	assumed	a	higher	adaptability	of	the	labor	force	to	structural	
changes	implied	by	the	low	carbon	transition16.	
	
• Redirection	of	infrastructure	investments	and	of	spatial	planning	to	reduce	the	‘constrained	
mobility	needs’	of	which	importance	has	been	demonstrated	in	scenario	V0.	We	consider	improved	
traffic	 regulation,	 increase	 of	 the	 share	 of	 non-gasoline	 based	 transportation	 modes	 (soft	
transportation	modes,	electric	vehicles,	rail	and	waterways).	 In	our	numerical	exercises,	we	assume	
that	this	redirection	is	critically	important	to	shift	mobility	trends	and	control	the	rebound	effect	on	
mobility	 demand	 triggered	 by	 increases	 of	 the	 energy	 efficiency	 of	 vehicles.	 This	 is	 really	 a	
‘redirection’	 scenario	 since	 we	 assume	 no	 increase	 of	 the	 total	 investment	 in	 the	 transportation	
sector	by	comparison	with	the	reference	scenario	R.	
These	 two	 sets	 of	 policies	 work	 synergistically	 through	 the	 interplays	 between	 the	 spatial	
organization	 (urban	 forms,	 urban	 systems,	 links	 with	 cities	 and	 their	 rural	 neighborhood),	 the	
commercial	 networks	 and	 the	 local	 content	 of	 goods	 and	 services	 for	 the	 final	 consumers.	 This	
determines	both	 the	 local	employment	content	of	activity	and	 the	 trends	 in	 the	 freight	 content	of	
overall	production.	The	freight	content	is	indeed	an	obstacle	to	decarbonize	the	economy	17	which	is	
underestimated	in	modeling	exercises	that	do	not	link	its	evolution	to	assumptions	about	the	spatial	
footprint	of	the	production	systems.	
Obviously,	 scenario	 V1	 cannot	 capture	 in	 a	 simple	 and	 mechanical	 way	 interplays	 of	 which	 real	
functioning	will	depend	upon	the	coordination	of	policies	between	departments	often	operating	 in	
isolation	 and	 across	 various	 governance	 levels	 (countries,	 regions,	 cities).	 It	 remains	 a	 ‘virtual’	
scenario;	however,	 it	helps	understanding	the	move	in	the	‘possibility	spaces’	at	stake	in	this	set	of	
policies.	
The	 carbon	 tax	 profile	 in	 this	 V1	 scenario	 is	 almost	 identical	 with	 this	 profile	 in	 the	 previous	 V0	
scenario.	This	might	be	surprising	since	V1	scenario	incorporates	investment	infrastructures	aiming	at	
                                                                                                                                                                 
deployment	of	energy	efficiency	in	buildings.	
15Energy-related	investments	encompass	investments	for	energy	supply	as	well	as	on	the	demand	side.	
16Guivarch	et	al.	(2010)	explain	the	macroeconomic	costs	of	climate	policies	by	the	labor	market	flexibility.	The	notion	of	
flexibly	 in	this	context	 is	 the	pace	at	which	the	 labor	force	switches	to	one	 job	to	another.	 In	case	of	 full	 flexibility,	 in	a	
certain	macroeconomic	context,	the	necessity	to	switch	of	jobs	does	not	indeed	result	into	a	lower	use	of	labor	forces.		
17For	example,	Crassous	et	al.	(2006)	find	pessimistic	cost	of	climate	policies	in	the	long	run	in	the	absence	of	modification	
of	 the	dynamics	 in	 freight	 intensity	of	 growth.	 The	penetration	of	 cheap	 carbon-free	 substitutes	 to	 gasoline	 and	diesel	
comes	too	late	to	curb	down	emission	trends	without	curbing	down	economic	growth.	
30 
 
controlling	 the	 growth	 of	 mobility	 needs.	 The	 reason	 is	 that,	 given	 the	 inertia	 of	 transportation	
infrastructures,	these	investments	significantly	alter	the	mobility	demand	and	GHGs	emissions	trends	
beyond	20	years	only18.	Before	 this	date,	 they	hardly	 compensate	 for	 the	need	of	higher	prices	 to	
compensate,	 ceteris	 paribus,	 for	 the	 higher	 emissions	 generated	 by	 the	 1%	 higher	 total	 output	 in	
2030.	
	
Table	8:	Carbon	prices	($/tCO2)	
	 High	oil	prices	(HOP)	 Low	oil	prices	(LOP)	
	 R	 V0	 V1	 R	 V0	 V1	
2015-2020	 0	 26	 28	 0	 170	 173	
2020-2025	 0	 49	 49	 0	 288	 285	
2025-2030	 0	 132	 136	 0	 248	 224	
2030-2035	 0	 320	 334	 0	 461	 416	
	
Although	 the	 differences	 are	 numerically	 low,	 it	 matters	 to	 understand	 why,	 despite	 a	 slightly	
superior	carbon	tax	profile	(Table	8),	hence	a	higher	burden	on	production	costs,	in	both	variants	V1	
scenarios	 achieves	 a	 slightly	 superior	 growth	 rate	 than	 V0	 scenario	 (Table	 9).	 	 Unemployment	 is	
respectively	1.9%	and	0.6%	lower	in	2020	in	HOP	and	LOP	variants,	2.3%	and	5.7	lower	in	2035	(Table	
12).	Some	of	the	mechanisms	at	play	in	this	result	will	indeed	be	magnified	in	V2	and	V3	scenarios:		
	
• Lower	 mobility	 needs	 and	 lower	 freight	 content	 of	 production	 reduces	 oil	 imports	 and	
allows	 for	 higher	wages	 since	 EU	 is	 less	 forced	 to	 export	 to	meet	 the	 same	 trade	 balance.	 Even	
though	 infrastructure	 decisions	 deliver	 the	 bulk	 of	 their	 benefit	 over	 the	medium	 and	 long	 term,	
some	 of	 them	 like	 traffic	 management	 or	 speed	 regulation	 lower	 the	 energy	 expenditures	 of	
households	over	the	short	term.	The	external	transfers	due	to	oil	imports	are	reduced	by	13%	in	2020	
and	34%	in	2035	between	V1	and	V0	scenarios.	
	
• Higher	energy	investments	create	a	higher	domestic	demand	for	activities	thanks	to	a	faster	
adaptation	 of	 labor	 forces.	 The	 degree	 of	 exposure	 of	 the	 overall	 economy	 to	 international	
                                                
18On	the	same	topic,	see	Waisman	et	al.	(2012a).	
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competition	decreases	which	limits	the	adverse	effect	of	higher	production	costs	(higher	wages	and	
higher	energy	costs)	in	terms	of	market	shares	(both	in	the	European	internal	market	and	in	foreign	
markets).	
	
Table	9:	GDP	MER	Real	-	Growth	rates	(%)	
	 High	oil	prices	 Low	oil	prices	
	 R	 V0	 V1	 R	 V0	 V1	
2010-2035	 0.78	 0.52	 0.56	 0.95	 0.62	 0.67	
2015-2020	 0.65	 0.57	 0.64	 0.97	 -0.83	 -0.78	
2020-2030	 1.11	 0.86	 0.92	 1.33	 1.81	 1.92	
2030-2035	 2.16	 1.51	 1.49	 2.23	 1.57	 1.56	
	
The	 slight	 increase	 of	 economic	 growth	 between	 V1	 and	 V0	 scenarios	 obviously	 slows	 down	 the	
crowding	 out	 effect	 on	 non	 decarbonation	 related	 investments	 and	 the	 decrease	 of	 overall	
productivity	 from	 the	 reference	 scenario	 R.	 However,	 compared	 with	 a	 no	 policy	 scenario,	 a	 low	
carbon	transition	mainstreamed	with	structural	change	policies,	has	a	negative	impact	that	increases	
the	risk	of	long	depression	in	the	EU.	The	good	news	however	is	that	the	comparison	between	V1	and	
V0	scenarios	however	helped	to	detect	the	negative	and	positive	mechanisms	at	play.	The	question	is	
then	how	to	reduce	the	former	and	magnify	the	latter.	Two	main	tools	are	at	our	disposal	to	do	so,	
fiscal	policies	and	finance.	We	analyze	them	in	Variants	V2	and	V3	scenarios.	
	
3.2 When climate friendly fiscal reforms come into play 
	
The	main	reason	why	the	two	above	policy	packages,	despite	very	optimistic	assumptions	about	the	
penetration	 of	 energy	 efficiency	 and	 about	 the	 deployment	 of	 structural	 policies	 still	 result	 into	 a	
negative	impact	on	growth	by	comparison	with	the	Reference	scenario	R	is	the	adverse	mechanisms	
resulting	from	higher	production	costs.	
	
V0	and	V1	scenarios	actually	assume	that	the	revenues	due	to	the	difference	between	the	marginal	
production	cost	 resulting	 from	carbon	abatement	and	 the	average	production	cost	are	 retained	by	
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industry	 with	 no	 guarantee	 that	 they	 are	 optimally	 recycled	 into	 the	 economy.	 This	 is	 a	 well-
established,	although	often	forgotten,	result	 in	public	economics	that	the	ultimate	cost	of	a	tax	 (of	
any	 cost	 increase	 of	 a	 production	 factor)	 is	 higher	 than	 its	 direct	 costs.	 This	 is	 due	 to	 (i)	 the	
propagation	of	cost	 increases	throughout	the	 inter-industrial	matrix,	 (ii)	 the	rents	generated	by	the	
different	“pass-through”	capacities	of	the	various	sectors	(share	of	the	cost	increase	passed	through	
the	 downstream	 sector)	 and	 (iii)	 the	 dead-weight	 losses	 for	 consumers,	 the	 so-called	 Harberger’s	
triangle.		
The	only	way	to	prevent	the	propagation	mechanism	is	to	raise	an	explicit	carbon	tax	and	to	recycle	
its	 revenues	 into	 the	 economy	 so	 as	 to	 decrease	 in	 the	 same	 proportion	 a	 distortionary	 taxation	
falling	on	production.	The	optimal	recycling	is	country	specific	and	this	is	the	reason	why,	in	its	article	
136,	the	Paris	Agreement	states	that	carbon	pricing	“applies	to	non-party	entities,	and	is	not	binding	
upon	 countries	 that	 are	 parties	 to	 the	 UNFCCC.”	We	 could	 not	 carry	 out	 a	 precise	 study	 for	 each	
country	within	the	scope	of	this	study.	Otherwise,	this	would	have	required	to	represent	the	country	
specific	energy	pricing	policies	and	very	likely,	differentiated	carbon	prices.	This	is	why	we	considered	
the	most	common	option	in	empirical	literature,	namely	a	switch	between	carbon	taxes	and	payroll	
taxes.19	
Thanks	to	this	switch,	the	rise	in	production	costs	caused	by	the	carbon	tax	is	lower.		It	even	declines	
for	the	more	labor-intensive	industry	(80%	of	the	value	added)	that	benefits	more	of	the	decline	of	
the	tax	burden	on	labor.	It	is	far	lower	on	energy	intensive	industry.		This	explains	why	the	production	
cost	of	composite	goods	can	decline,	at	certain	time	periods.	Actually,	the	net	result	depends	upon	
the	 rate	 of	 increase	 of	 net	 wages	 allowed	 by	 this	 lower	 tax	 burden	 (if	 the	 increase	 of	 net	 wages	
absorb	the	cut	in	labor	taxes,	there	is	no	decrease	in	production	costs).	This	rate	is	governed	by	the	
wage/unemployment	elasticity	which	actually	captures	the	power	relationships	in	the	labor	market.		
For	 a	 given	 price	 elasticity	 of	 energy	 efficiency	 in	 the	 production	 sector	 (which,	 at	 this	 level	 of	
aggregation	encompasses	also	structural	changes),	the	penetration	of	energy	efficiency	in	industry	is	
accelerated	 because	 the	 ratio	 between	 the	 relative	 cost	 of	 energy	 and	 labor	 costs	 is	 significantly	
higher	thanks	to	the	recycling	of	the	carbon	tax	than	in	the	absence	of	this	recycling.	A	virtuous	cycle	
can	thus	be	launched	thanks	to	the	reconciliation	between	the	demand-side	and	supply-side	policies:	
increase	of	labor	per	unit	of	output	due	to	lower	gross	labor	costs	->	higher	employment	for	a	given	
activity	level	->	increase	of	net	wages	->	higher	households’	purchasing	->	stability	or	decrease	of	the	
domestic	 demand	 covered	 by	 foreign	 products	 because	 the	 production	 costs	 do	 not	 increase	 ->	
higher	demand	addressed	to	the	EU	production	system.	
                                                
19 There is plentiful literature on the double dividend and on carbon trading since the three indicates. This literature is 
regularly synthetized in IPCC reports: see Hourcade, Richels and Robinson, IPCC AR2, Chap 6 pp 272-274 chap 7 pp 303-
317; Hourcade and Shukla, IPCC AR3, Chap 6 pp512-522; Gupta and Tirpak, IPCC AR4 Chap 13 pp 753-769 and Clark 
and Jiang, IPCC AR5, Chap 6 Ppp 455-456 
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Table	10:	Carbon	prices	($/tCO2)	
	 High	oil	prices	 Low	oil	prices	
	 R	 V0	 V1	 V2	 R	 V0	 V1	 V2	
2015-2020	 0	 26	 28	 30	 0	 170	 173	 208	
2020-2025	 0	 49	 49	 54	 0	 288	 285	 379	
2025-2030	 0	 132	 136	 156	 0	 248	 224	 254	
2030-2035	 0	 320	 334	 384	 0	 461	 416	 425	
 
Table	11:	GDP	MER	Real	-	Growth	rates	(%)	
	 High	oil	prices	 Low	oil	prices	
	 R	 V0	 V1	 V2	 R	 V0	 V1	 V2	
2015-2035	 0.98	 0.73	 0.76	 0.77	 1.13	 0.63	 0.67	 1.03	
2015-2020	 0.65	 0.57	 0.64	 0.73	 0.97	 -0.83	 -0.78	 0.57	
2020-2030	 1.11	 0.86	 0.92	 1.08	 1.33	 1.81	 1.92	 1.51	
2030-2035	 2.16	 1.51	 1.49	 2.13	 2.23	 1.57	 1.56	 2.05	
	
Logically	 though,	V2	 scenario	 generates	 a	higher	GDP	growth	and	a	 lower	unemployment	 than	V1	
and	V0	 scenarios	 (Table	11).	 The	differences	are	 small	 in	a	HOP	variant	 (0.04	and	0.01	percentage	
point	on	average	over	the	period)	and	significant	in	a	LOP	variant	(0.37	and	0.40	percentage	point.	In	
2035,	the	total	GDP	is	7.1%	higher	in	V2	scenario	than	in	V1	scenario	which	explains	the	necessity	of	a	
15%	 percent	 higher	 carbon	 price	 (384$/tc)	 (Table	 10).	 The	 critical	 result	 for	 the	 inclusiveness	 of	
development	 is	 a	 significant	 reduction	 of	 unemployment	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 period	 (-26%	 in	 2035)	
(Table	12).	These	optimist	results	must	be	qualified	by	the	fact	that	this	reduction	is	small	up	to	2025;	
up	 to	 this	date	 indeed	 the	 low	 level	of	 carbon	 taxation	does	not	allow	 for	 significant	 cuts	 in	 labor	
taxes.	
The	key	comparison	is	obviously	between	V2	scenario	and	the	reference	scenario	R.	Over	the	period,	
V2	scenario	generates	results	systematically	into	a	lower	growth	rate:	a	small	minus	0.01%	per	year	in	
a	HOP	variant	and	a	more	significant	minus	0.08%	in	a	LOP	variant.	Despite	a	higher	labor	intensity	of	
growth,	 the	resulting	unemployment	 is	significantly	higher	 in	the	LOP	variant	 (+13%	in	2035	with	a	
peak	of	19%	in	2020)	and	slightly	higher	in	the	HOP	variant.	
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This	means	 that	 the	 recycling	scheme	retained	 in	 the	simulation	 is	not	efficient	enough	to	prevent	
the	increase	of	production	costs	and	generate	a	strong	form	of	double	dividend.	
Table	12:	Variation	in	the	unemployment	rate	compared	to	the	Reference	scenario	R	
High oil prices Low oil prices 
Senario		 2015	 2020	 2025	 2030	 2035	
R	 1	 1.00	 1.00	 1.00	 1.00	
V0	 1	 1.02	 1.06	 1.09	 1.28	
V1	 1	 1.00	 1.06	 1.09	 1.25	
V2	 1	 0.98	 1.01	 0.99	 1.00	
V3	 1	 0.90	 0.75	 0.78	 0.79	
 
Scénario		 2015	 2020	 2025	 2030	 2035	
R	 1	 1.00	 1.00	 1.00	 1.00	
V0	 1	 1.57	 1.40	 1.31	 1.56	
V1	 1	 1.56	 1.30	 1.18	 1.42	
V2	 1	 1.12	 1.06	 1.00	 1.07	
V3	 1	 0.94	 0.90	 0.88	 0.79	
 
 
These	results	 should	not	be	over-interpreted	since	slightly	different	parameter	choices	and	a	more	
careful	 design	 of	 the	 recycling	 scheme	 (incorporating	 country	 specifics)	 would	 reverse	 their	 sign.	
However,	 our	 experience	with	 the	 IMACLIM-R	model	 confirms	 the	 conclusions	 of	 the	many	works	
about	double	dividend,	namely	 the	 fact	 that,	when	 this	policy	 variant	 leads	 to	an	 increase	 in	 total	
output,	this	increase	is	limited.	It	is	all	the	more	limited	than	part	of	the	revenues	of	the	carbon	tax	
should	 be	 used	 to	 offset	 adverse	 distributional	 effects	 (Combet	 et	 al.	 2010).	 Recycling	 carbon	 tax	
revenues	 is	 thus	 critical	 for	 conducting	 climate	 policies	 at	 almost	 zero	 aggregate	 macroeconomic	
costs.		But	it	is	not	apt	to	trigger	a	significant	“Green	Growth”	dynamics	especially	because	of	the	fact	
that	 its	 ‘second	dividend’	 is	 not	 strong	 enough	over	 the	 short	 term	 to	 offset	 the	 costs	 due	 to	 the	
inertia	of	socio-technical	systems.	
	
3.3 When climate finance comes into play 
	
In	 the	 economic	 framework	 utilized	 so	 far	 it	 would	 be	 possible	 to	 generate	 Green	 Growth	
perspectives	 using	 even	more	 optimistic	 assumptions	 about	 learning-by-doing	 process	 and	 overall	
endogenous	feedbacks	between	technical	change	and	growth.	However,	beyond	the	fact	that	these	
assumptions	would	be	made	for	pure	convenience	and	be	suspected	of	being	unrealistic,	they	would	
not	solve	the	‘triggering	phase’	problem	because	their	benefits	would	not	span	quickly	enough	over	
the	short	term	to	offset	the	residual	negative	impacts	of	carbon	prices	that	have	not	been	offset	by	a	
well-targeted	recycling	of	their	revenues.	
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Over	the	short	term,	the	only	margin	of	freedom	is	both	to	trigger	a	strong	decarbonisation	process	
with	 lower	 carbon	 prices	 and	 to	 look	 seriously	 how	 climate	 policies	 could	 help	 reduce	 the	 other	
sources	 of	 ‘overall	 efficiency	 gap’	 than	 those	 so	 far	 evoked	 in	 climate	 change	 economics.	 The	 low	
carbon	 scenarios	 have	 generally	 been	 developed	 so	 far	 with	 no	 consideration	 of	 ongoing	
macroeconomic	discussion	about	the	fault	lines	of	the	world	economy	(Rajan	2010)	and	the	alerts	of	
top	 level	 macroeconomists	 about	 risks	 of	 i)	 ‘depression	 economics’	 (Krugman	 2010)	 ii)	 secular	
stagnation	 (Summers	 2015)	 and	 iii)	 the	 rising	 number	 of	 ‘discontents’	 of	 the	 globalization	 process	
(Stiglitz	 2002).	 This	 deprives	 from	 examining	 how,	 because	 it	 requires	 a	 huge	 redirection	 of	
investments,	the	 low	carbon	transition	could	help	reduce	the	gap	between	the	‘propensity	to	save’	
and	the	‘propensity	to	invest’	in	long	term	productive	assets	and	infrastructures	which	is	pinpointed	
as	one	major	source	of	fragility	of	the	world	economy	(IMF	2013).		
The	low	propensity	to	invest	results	from	three	intertwined	features	of	our	modern	economies:	i)	risk	
uncertainty,	ii)	a	“shareholder	business	regime”	and	iii)	a	financial	intermediation	system	cautious	to	
transform	 cash	 balances	 into	 long-term	 assets	 (Aglietta	 2014,	 IMF	 2013).	 This	 penalizes	 the	 low	
carbon	investments	and	undermines	the	incentive	efficacy	of	carbon	prices.	Indeed,	techniques	are	
not	 on	 a	 shelf,	 ranked	 in	 increasing	 order	 of	 their	 levelized	 costs	 and	 switching	 carbon	 prices	
might	 be	 higher	 than	 those	 needed	 to	 change	 this	 merit	 order.	 Low	 carbon	 investments	 (LCIs)	
with	 high	 capex	 and	 long	 payback	 periods	 might	 not	 be	 adopted	 because	 of	 their	 risks	 in	 a	
context	of	uncertainty	 about	 the	duration	 and	costs	of	their	construction	 phase	 and	 about	 their	
future	 revenues.	 In	 case	 of	 ‘bad	 surprise’,	 firms	and	 economic	 agents	 can	 see	 their	operating	
account	 deficits	 reaching	 a	 ‘danger	 line’	 they	 refrain	 from	 crossing.	 This	 implicit	 danger	 line	
explains	 households’	 i ) 	 demand	 for	 very	 short	 payback	 periods	 for	 investments	 in	 energy	
efficiency,	 ii)	 the	 behavior	 of	 SMEs	 with	 limited	 access	 to	 finance	 beyond	 self-finance	 or	 iii)	of	
firms	who	anticipate	that,	some	shareholders	 losing	confidence,	 their	value	might	fall	sharply	with	
risks	of	bankruptcy	or	of	hostile	takeover.			
In	 this	 policy	 package	 of	 the	 V3	 scenario	 we	 thus	 incorporate	 a	 financial	 device	 that	 lowers	
investment	risks	in	low	carbon	projects.	Redirecting	savings	towards	the	low	carbon	transition	could	
narrow	 the	 excess	 of	 savings	 over	 investments	 by	 indicating	 in	 a	 credible	 manner	 where	 the	
investments	 should	 go.	 This	 would	 accelerate	 the	 trickling	 down	 of	 savings	 into	 the	 productive	
economy,	 immediately	 reduce	 the	existing	excess	 capacities	 and	offset	 the	 crowding	out	effect	on	
other	productive	sectors	by	increasing	the	savings	dedicated	to	long-term	investments.	Doing	so	they	
would	magnify	the	positive	effects	of	measures	contained	in	V1	and	V2	scenarios.	
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Table	13:	Carbon	prices	($t/CO2)	
	 High	oil	prices	 Low	oil	prices	
	 R	 V0	 V1	 V2	 V3	 R	 V0	 V1	 V2	 V3	
2015-2020	 0	 26	 28	 30	 11	 0	 170	 173	 208	 152	
2020-2025	 0	 49	 49	 54	 77	 0	 288	 285	 379	 350	
2025-2030	 0	 132	 136	 156	 130	 0	 248	 224	 254	 233	
2030-2035	 0	 320	 334	 384	 390	 0	 461	 416	 425	 461	
 
We	will	not	in	this	report	enter	into	the	precise	design	of	such	a	device	of	which	we	give	a	sketch	in	
Box	 1.	 The	 basic	 principle	 is	 to	 consider	 part	 of	 the	 upfront	 investment	 costs	 without	 waiting	
uncertain	and	delayed	revenues	of	 the	reduction	carbon	emissions,	which	 is	one	of	 the	recognized	
limits	of	the	clean	development	mechanism	(Hourcade	et	al.	2012).	This	opportunity	can	be	seized	if	
States	and	sub-sovereign	entities	undertake	gently	to	reduce	initial	risks	in	these	shifts	by	providing	
public	guarantees	in	a	coordinated	way.	Public	guarantees,	implicit	or	explicit,	do	not	entail	a	large	
burden	 on	 tax	 payers,	 and	 have	 always	 been	 important	 in	 underwriting	 global	 transformations	 in	
history	(railways,	electricity,	telecommunications).	
To	hedge	against	the	risk	of	political	arbitrariness	in	the	allocation	of	these	guarantees	and	secure	
their	 overall	 economic	 efficiency	 they	 should	 be	 articulated	 around	 a	 robust	 Measurement,	
Reporting	 and	Verification	 (MRV)	 process	 and	 around	 an	 agreed	 upon	 per	 ton	 value	 of	 avoided	
emissions.	 This	 value	 should	 express	 the	 social,	 economic,	 and	 environ-	 mental	 value(s)	 of	
mitigation	(SVM)	actions	[and]	their	co-benefits	to	adaptation,	health,	sustainable	development	as	
recommended	by	the	para	108	of	the	decision	of	the	‘Paris	Agreement’.	It	is	a	notional	price	that	
represents	 the	 present	 value	 of	 the	 trajectory	 of	 shadow	 prices	 of	 carbon	 for	meeting	 the	 2°C	
target	augmented	by	the	co-benefits	of	mitigation.	This	comes	to	give	upfront	to	the	investors	the	
‘reward’	that	the	policy-makers	cannot	commit	to	give	through	explicit	carbon	prices	aligned	with	
this	trajectory	(see	Box	1	for	a	short	discussion).	
The	 reduction	 of	 the	 capital	 costs	 of	 a	 given	 technology	 depends	 actually	 on	 its	 lifetime.	 	 At	 the	
aggregate	level,	the	results	obtained	in	IMACLIM-R	are	a	90$/t	value	for	an	average	15	years	lifetime	
of	investments	and	a	23%	cut	in	investments	costs	of	low	carbon	technologies	which	is	equivalent	to	
halve	the	interests’	rates.	
The	 main	 result,	 reported	 in	 table	 14,	 is	 that	 the	 GDP	 growth	 is	 significantly	 higher	 than	 in	 the	
Reference	 scenario	 R	 at	 all	 time	 periods	 and,	 politically	 more	 important,	 including	 at	 first	 period	
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between	2015	and	2020.	The	growth	rate	is	still	below	2%	before	2020	which	means	that	there	is	no	
‘economic	miracle’,	but	this	positive	trend	continues	over	the	following	decade,	and	stagnation	phase	
in	the	EU	is	over	after	2030	with	a	4.3%	growth	rate.	The	latter	figure	looks	very	optimistic	nowadays	
but	it	is	worth	recalling	that	this	allows	for	a	2.5%	growth	rate	in	EU15	which	is	the	level	needed	to	
end	with	the	structural	unemployment	in	many	countries	of	this	region	(France,	Greece,	Italy,	Spain,	
and	Portugal).		
To	understand	the	mechanisms	at	play,	let	us	come	back	to	the	time	profile	of	the	carbon	tax	in	the	
V3	scenarios.	In	both	all	prices	variants,	the	carbon	taxes	are	slightly	higher	than	in	V2	scenario	after	
2030.	This	is	due	to	the	need	to	offset	the	impact	of	higher	growth	rate	on	final	energy	demand	but	
its	burden	on	households	and	enterprises	 is	 lower.	More	important	for	the	political	acceptability	of	
climate	 policies	 is	 that	 they	 significantly	 lower	 at	 first	 period	 than	 in	 other	 carbon	 constrained	
scenario.	To	put	it	in	another	way,	with	lower	investment	risks,	the	higher	amount	of	investments	is	
triggered	 by	 a	 given	 level	 of	 carbon	 price.	 This	 changes	 the	 political	 economy	 of	 tax	 reforms.	 The	
difference	 between	 a	 real	 carbon	 price	 and	 a	 shadow	 carbon	 price	 is	 that	 the	 former	 hits	 vested	
interest	whereas	the	latter	redirects.	The	difference	is	impressive	in	the	HOP	variant	with	a	tax	one	
third	lower	than	in	V2	scenario.	The	difference	is	significant	by	less	impressive	in	the	LOP	variant	in	
which	the	carbon	tax	should	reach	152$.	This	is	the	mechanical	result	of	the	fact	that	the	carbon	tax	
has	to	compensate	for	the	low	level	of	the	prices	of	fossil	fuels.	
	
This	means	that	a	SVMA	higher	that	90$/t	(around	150$/t)	should	be	adopted	with	the	corresponding	
amount	of	public	guarantees	to	launch	the	transition	with	the	same	time	profile	of	carbon	taxes	over	
the	two	first	decades.	But	this	 is	a	problem	of	policy	 implementation	and	does	not	change	the	fact	
that	 this	 policy	 package	 can	 generate	 a	 significant	 higher	 growth	 over	 the	 short	 run	which	 is	 the	
major	obstacle	to	triggering	action.		
	
Table	14:	GDP	MER	Real	-	Growth	rates	(%)	
	 High	oil	prices	 Low	oil	prices	
	 R	 V0	 V1	 V2	 V3	 R	 V0	 V1	 V2	 V3	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
2015-2020	 0.65	 0.57	 0.64	 0.73	 1.89	 0.97	 -0.83	 -0.78	 0.57	 2.05	
2020-2030	 1.11	 0.86	 0.92	 1.08	 2.13	 1.33	 1.81	 1.92	 1.51	 1.83	
2030-2035	 2.16	 1.51	 1.49	 2.13	 4.3	 2.23	 1.57	 1.56	 2.05	 4.47	
2015-2035	 0.98	 0.73	 0.76	 0.98	 2.07	 1.13	 0.63	 0.67	 1.03	 2.075	
38 
 
	
However,	the	increase	of	carbon	prices	is	not	the	only	one	obstacle	to	deploying	mechanisms	leading	
to	 this	positive	outcome.	The	 low	carbon	 transition	described	 in	V3	 scenarios	 represent	 indeed	an	
investment	shock	of	which	apex,	in	2025,	is	a	70%	and	95%	higher	than	in	the	reference	scenario	R	in	
HOP	 and	 LOP	 variants	 respectively	 (these	 costs	 include	 investments	 in	 electricity	 generation,	
transmission	 and	 distribution,	 energy	 efficiency,	 other	 energy	 investments,	 transportation	
investments	and	upstream	industrial	investments	for	material	processing	and	machinery).	Passed	this	
shock	the	incremental	investment	costs	reduce	to	9%	and	15%	only.	
	
Over	 the	 triggering	phase	of	 the	 low	carbon	 transition,	 the	critical	 issue	 is	 the	compatibility	of	 this	
level	of	 investments	with	public	budget	constraints.	The	funding	needs	at	stake	are	the	sum	of	the	
incremental	investment	costs	and	of	the	redirection	of	a	share	of	the	investments	anticipated	in	the	
Reference	scenario	R	(between	30%	and	35%	depending	on	the	scenario	variant).	They	are	between	
89$	and	126G$	in	the	HOP	and	LOP	variants	in	2020	and	about	180$	in	2025.	The	advantage	of	public	
guarantees	is	that	they	are	exerted	only	in	case	of	failure	of	the	projects.	With	a	100%	rate	of	success	
their	burden	on	public	budgets	is	null.	Assuming	a	20%	risk	of	failure	(a	conventional	ratio)	a	public	
guarantee	 of	 5$	 is	 thus	 composed	 of	 1$	 of	 paid-in	 capital	 that	 appears	 as	 a	 debt	 in	 the	 public	
accounts	 and	4$	of	 callable	 capital.	 Assuming	 a	 very	 conservative	 leverage	of	 2	 on	private	 capital,	
1$	of	paid-in	capital	would	then	lever	10$	of	investments	(the	Junker	Plan	performs	a	leverage	ratio	
of	15).	Thus,	between	8	to	13$	of	paid-in	capital	in	2020	and	28$	in	2025	would	suffice	in	leveraging	
the	needed	funds.	These	amounts	have	to	be	compared	with	the	34G$	yielded	by	a	small	0,01$	tax	
on	 fossil	 fuels	 in	 the	 EU.	 Ultimately,	 a	 low	 carbon	 transition	 supported	 by	 the	 couple	 public	
guarantees	+	SVMA	would	thus	improve	public	budgets:	assuming	a	low	33%	of	tax	on	the	revenues	
yielded	 by	 the	 generated	 project	 (and	 ignoring	 their	 spill-over	 effects	 on	 economic	 activity)	 and	 a	
high	20$	default	rate,	1$	of	paid-in	capital	would	yield	1.33$	of	tax	revenues.	
	
Over	the	long	term,	the	critical	issue	for	the	economic	viability	of	the	low	carbon	transition	is	to	what	
extent	extra	energy	 investments	(which	are	over	the	period	one	third	higher	than	 in	the	Reference	
scenario	R)	crowds	out	other	productive	investments	and	slow	down	the	productivity	growth	in	the	
non-energy	 related	 activities.	 Mechanically,	 this	 crowding	 out	 is	 lowered	 by	 the	 increase	 of	 GDP	
growth	 and	by	 the	 fact	 that,	 thanks	 to	 the	 financial	 devices	 at	 play,	 part	 of	 the	 European	 savings,	
instead	 of	 going	 into	 the	 ‘world	 pool’	 of	 capital	 and	 in	 real	 estates	 are	 invested	 in	 European	
infrastructures.	The	maximum	of	reduction	of	non-energy	related	investments	is	5%	in	2025	and	this	
reduction	 is	a	negligible	0,003%	 in	the	HOP	variant	against	1%	only	 in	 the	LOP	variant.	Despite	the	
fact	 that	 we	 did	 not	 consider	 any	 spillover	 effect	 of	 innovation	 in	 mitigation	 activities	 on	 other	
productive	sectors,	the	long	term	negative	impact	of	the	net	crowding	out	on	the	European	growth	
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engine	are	overcompensated	by	the	following	virtuous	circle	over	the	period,	which	is	made	up	of	all	
the	policy	components	of	V0,	V1,	V2	and	V3	scenarios:	
	
i) Lower	oil	and	gas	 imports	with	 lower	transfers	of	 income	outside	Europe	and	lower	exports	
needed	to	equilibrate	the	EU	trade	balance.	
ii) A	more	inward	oriented	economic	strategy	with	a	higher	share	of	‘non-exposed	activities’.		
iii) Higher	 wages,	 higher	 households	 demand	 thanks	 to	 (i)	 and	 (ii)	 and	 higher	 terms	 of	 trade	
(purchasing	power	of	an	hour	worked	in	terms	of	international	goods).	
iv) A	 higher	 demand	 addressed	 to	 the	 European	 Economy	 thanks	 to	 higher	 investments	 and	
higher	household	demand	and	lower	production	costs	in	most	sectors	thanks	to	the	recycling	
of	the	revenues	of	the	carbon	tax.	
v) Higher	employment	triggered	by	the	higher	demand	to	the	European	Economy	and	to	lower	
costs	of	labor	relative	to	other	production	factors.	
vi) The	medium	and	 long-term	overall	 productivity	 effect	of	 higher	productivity	of	 energy	 as	 a	
production	factor.	
vii) Improved	public	budgets	thanks	to	the	fact	that	only	the	share	of	public	guarantees	that	bear	
on	public	budgets	are	easily	compensated	by	the	tax	revenues	generated	by	the	guaranteed	
investments;	this	allows	for	(slightly)	lower	the	overall	tax	burden	on	GDP.	
viii) The	 long-term	gains	 from	 learning	by	doing	on	 the	production	of	 equipment	due	 to	higher	
investments	 in	 all	 sectors	 triggered	 by	 higher	 growth	 and	 cuts	 of	 investment	 risks	 in	 the	
energy	related	sectors.	This	accelerates	of	the	catch-up	of	the	EU	economy.		
	
Actually,	 the	 most	 important	 result,	 for	 the	 economic	 and	 political	 stability	 of	 Europe	 and	 the	
perception	of	climate	policies	as	a	lever	for	a	sustainable	and	inclusive	development	is	that	the	fact	
that	 this	 package	 reduces	 by	 10%	 and	 6%	 the	 unemployment	 at	 first	 period	 in	 the	 HOP	 and	 LOP	
variants,	respectively	and	by	and	20%	and	12%	after	2030.		
	
Conclusion: Policy insights from and beyond modeling exercises 
	
The	 conclusions	 of	 this	 study	 can	 be	 interpreted	 through	 two	 lenses.	 One	 gather	 advocates	 of	
enhanced	climate	action	and	the	second	one	the	climate	resigned	people	for	whom	the	priority	is	to	
draw	Europe	out	of	pressing	economic	and	political	tensions.	
For	 the	 pro-climate	 action	 advocates,	 this	 study	 confirms	 that	 launching	 now	 ambitious	 climate	
policies	 could	provide	 substantial	 co-benefits	 (growth,	 jobs,	 energy	 security)	 if	 the	 set	 of	 price	 and	
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non-price	policies	they	argue	for	is	reinforced	by	financial	devices	to	de-risk	low-carbon	investments.	
However,	it	also	alerts	that	this	positive	outcome	requires	very	specific	preconditions	without	which	a	
real	 burden	would	be	 imposed	on	 the	 European	economies	 especially	 over	 the	 triggering	phase	of	
ambitious	climate	policies:	 fiscal	 reforms	to	make	high	and	generalized	carbon	prices	politically	and	
macro-economically	 sustainable,	 standards	 and	 norms	 to	 promote	 energy	 efficiency,	 redirection	 of	
infrastructure	policies,	commitment	of	countries	to	provide	public	guarantees	in	function	of	a	social	
value	 per	 ton.	 But	 these	 conditions	will	 not	 be	 achieved	 for	 climate	 only	 objectives.	 This	 is	why	 it	
matters	to	borrow	the	lens	of	the	climate	resigned.	
Interpreted	 through	 these	 lens,	 the	 core	message	of	 this	 study	 is	 that	 climate	policies	 can	 respond	
part	of	their	short-term	concerns	about	the	fragility	of	the	economic	recovery	and	of	the	cohesion	of	
the	EU	by	accelerating	the	trickling	down	of	the	savings	towards	the	European	industrial	fabric.	They	
can	do	so,	despite	the	constraints	on	public	budgets,	by	underwriting	investments	with	liquid	financial	
instruments	 backed	 on	 secure	 climate	 remediation	 assets	 so	 as	 to	 upgrade	 the	 financial	 actors	
engagement	 (pension	 funds,	 insurance	 companies	 and	 bond	 markets)	 to	 fund	 low-carbon	
development	 projects	 now	 bankable	 thanks	 to	 the	 decrease	 of	 their	 risk-weighted	 capital	 cost.	
Passing	this	triggering	phase	will	allow	for	a	confidence	circle,	amongst	EU	member	states	and	within	
each	 country,	 nurtured	 by	 the	 deployment	 of	 a	 development	 model	 that	 will	 be	 (i)	 more	 labor	
intensive,	(ii)	more	inward	oriented,	(iii)	more	resilient	to	external	economic	and	political	conditions	
including	the	oil	prices,	(iv)	more	inclusive	thanks	to	better	infrastructures	and	with	a	higher	level	of	
energy	security.	
The	operational	ways	of	maintaining	this	confidence	circle	are	beyond	the	scope	of	this	study.	But	it	is	
possible	to	identify	three	major	areas	of	reflection:	
• Public	guarantees	on	 low	carbon	 investments	 can	be	one	major	 component	of	an	 increased	
common	European	budget	 to	 deploy	 a	 climate	 colored	 ‘Junker	 Plan’	 targeted	 to	 reinforcing	
the	European	social	cohesion,	
• The	harmonized	increase	of	carbon	prices,	facilitated	by	the	generation	of	new	credit	facilities	
and	 the	 access	 to	 new	 classes	 of	 assets	 can	 be	 a	 leeway	 for	 harmonizing	 progressively	 the	
taxation	on	labor	and	the	funding	modes	of	social	security.	
• The	decrease	of	risk-weighted	capital	cost	through	public	guarantees	can	facilitate	the	reform	
the	 EU-ETS.	 This	 system	 functions	 today	 as	 a	 race	 to	 the	 bottom	mechanism	whereby	 the	
setting	of	global	 targets	and	the	share	of	auctioned	allowances	cannot	but	be	 influenced	by	
the	political	bargaining	of	the	sectors	and	countries	the	most	hurt	by	higher	energy	prices.		
What	 is	 at	 stake	 here	 is	 a	 paradigm	 shift	 in	 climate	 policies	 towards	 positive	 pricing	 devices	 that	
launch	 in	due	time	the	right	and	strong	 incentives	 to	decision-makers	while	not	hurting	 less	vested	
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interests	and	offering	them	compensations	more	credible	than	transfers	relying	on	the	‘goodwill’	of	
taxpayers.	 It	 is	 possible	 indeed	 to	 offer	 households	 and	 enterprises	 trapped	 by	 past	 decisions	 or	
countries	 relying	 on	 important	 fossil	 energy	 resources,	 the	 access	 to	 a	 new	 class	 of	 climate	
remediation	assets.	This	demands	institutional	innovations	beyond	the	scope	of	this	numerical	study	
but	that	are	implicitly	needed	to	deploy	the	economic	trajectories	it	describes	(see	Box	n°2).	
Actually,	 this	 study	 translates	 in	 the	European	context	 the	Cancun’s	paradigm	shift	 adopted	by	 the	
UNFCCC	 COP16	 Cancun.	 That	 moves	 from	 a	 ‘burden	 sharing	 approach’	 to	 a	 ‘equitable	 access	 to	
development	 principle’.	 However,	 because	 it	 purposefully	 envisages	 a	 unilateral	 European	 climate	
policy	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 their	 triggering	 should	 not	 be	 postponed	 even	 in	 the	 absence	 of	world	
agreement,	it	does	not	go	to	the	logical	end	of	this	paradigm	shift.	But	it	lays	the	basis	for	establishing	
an	instrument	of	trust	between	developed	and	developing	countries	to	trigger	a	wave	of	low	carbon	
investments,	 with	 large	 positive	 impacts	 on	 global	 economic	 growth,	 employment	 and	 poverty	
reduction.		
The	 articulation	of	 public	 guarantees	 and	 SVMA	analyzed	 in	 this	 report	 could	 be	 indeed	used	by	 a	
Group	 of	 Initiatives	 for	 Climate	 Finance	 (GICF)	 composed	 of	 willing	 developed	 and	 developing	
countries	 to	 (i)	 catalyze	global	 savings	 to	 finance	 sustainable	 low-carbon	 infrastructure	and	 climate	
resilient	development	(Paris	Agreement	(P.A.),	Article	2)	and	(ii)	help	developing	countries	to	actualize	
their	 Nationally	 Determined	 Contributions	 (NDCs)	 by	 expanding	 their	 access	 to	 capital	 markets	 at	
lower	cost	and	longer	maturities,	and	by	creating	pipelines	of	projects	through	which	their	industry,	
cities	and	 local	 communities.	 Such	mechanism	will	 advance	 the	UN’s	2030	Agenda	and	achieve	 the	
Sustainable	Development	Goals	(SDGs).		
Doing	so,	the	European	Union	could	really	take	the	leadership	in	climate	policies,	with	a	high	level	of	
political	 credibility	 thanks	 to	 the	 support	 of	 the	 European	 citizens	 reassured	 by	 tangible	 and	 short	
term	proofs	that	of	the	benefits	of	investing	for	building	a	less	risky	and	more	desirable	future.	
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Appendix: detailed figures 
1. GDP 
Table	15:	GDP	MER	Real	-	Growth	rates	(%)	
High oil prices Low oil prices 
Scénario		 2015-	
2035	
2015-	
2020	
2020-	
2030	
2030-	
2035	
R	 0.78	 0.65	 1.11	 2.16	
V0	 0.52	 0.57	 0.86	 1.51	
V1	 0.56	 0.64	 0.92	 1.49	
V2	 0.77	 0.73	 1.08	 2.13	
V3	 1.61	 1.89	 1.48	 4.13	
 
Scénario		 2015-	
2035	
2015-	
2020	
2020-	
2030	
2030-	
2035	
R	 0.95	 0.97	 1.33	 2.23	
V0	 0.62	 -0.83	 1.81	 1.57	
V1	 0.67	 -078	 1.92	 1.56	
V2	 0.87	 0.57	 1.51	 2.05	
V3	 1.81	 2.05	 1.83	 4.47	
 
	
2. Oil prices 
Fig.	7:	Oil	prices	($/bbl)	
High oil prices Low oil prices 
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3. Carbon tax 
Table	16:	Carbon	tax	($/tCO2)	
High oil prices Low oil prices 
Scénario		 2015-	
2020	
2020-	
2025	
2025-	
2030	
2030-	
2035	
R	 0	 0	 0	 0	
V0	 26	 49	 132	 320	
V1	 28	 49	 136	 334	
V2	 30	 54	 156	 384	
V3	 11	 77	 130	 390	
 
Scénario		 2015-	
2020	
2020-	
2025	
2025-	
2030	
2030	
-2035	
R	 0	 0	 0	 0	
V0	 170	 288	 248	 461	
V1	 173	 285	 224	 416	
V2	 208	 379	 254	 425	
V3	 152	 350	 233	 461	
 
 
Table	17:	Carbon	tax	revenues	(G$)	
High oil prices Low oil prices 
Scénario		 2015	 2020	 2025	 2030	 2035	
R	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
V0	 0	 68	 300	 520	 1193	
V1	 0	 73	 307	 522	 1524	
V2	 0	 79	 378	 583	 1524	
V3	 0	 89	 353	 565	 1513	
 
Scénario		 2015	 2020	 2025	 2030	 2035	
R	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
V0	 0	 1160	 833	 737	 1820	
V1	 0	 1154	 798	 617	 1649	
V2	 0	 1470	 971	 644	 1712	
V3	 0	 1260	 866	 736	 1872	
 
 
 
4. Wages over price index 
	
Table	18:	Purchasing	power	of	wages	(wages	over	pind,	index	1	in	2001)	
High oil prices Low oil prices 
Scénario		 2015	 2020	 2025	 2030	 2035	
R	 1.15	 1.16	 1.2	 1.26	 1.42	
V0	 1.14	 1.14	 1.15	 1.18	 1.24	
V1	 1.14	 1.15	 1.16	 1.20	 1.25	
V2	 1.14	 1.16	 1.19	 1.26	 1.40	
V3	 1.19	 1.28	 1.32	 1.40	 1.61	
 
Scénario		 2015	 2020	 2025	 2030	 2035	
R	 1.2	 1.25	 1.33	 1.42	 1.61	
V0	 1.18	 1.01	 1.16	 1.28	 1.34	
V1	 1.18	 1.02	 1.18	 1.32	 1.37	
V2	 1.18	 1.17	 1.28	 1.40	 1.53	
V3	 1.22	 1.28	 1.38	 1.53	 1.78	
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5. Investment 
	
Table	19:	Total	investment	flows	(incorporal	investment	excluded)	(G$)	
High oil prices Low oil prices 
Scénario		 2015	 2020	 2025	 2030	 2035	
R	 2240	 2293	 2391	 2472	 2677	
V0	 2240	 2283	 2336	 2381	 2475	
V1	 2240	 2290	 2352	 2407	 2500	
V2	 2240	 2299	 2367	 2443	 2587	
V3	 2240	 2398	 2457	 2567	 2217	
 
Scénario	 2015	 2020	 2025	 2030	 2035	
R	 2240	 2341	 2489	 2618	 2861	
V0	 2240	 2096	 2324	 2479	 2564	
V1	 2240	 2101	 2342	 2519	 2606	
V2	 2240	 2206	 2407	 2572	 2710	
V3	 2240	 2311	 2515	 2732	 3082	
 
	
Table	20:	Energy	investment	(bn$)	
High oil prices Low oil prices 
Scénario		 2015	 2020	 2025	 2030	 2035	
R	 111	 142	 173	 187	 203	
V0	 111	 147	 212	 219	 205	
V1	 111	 146	 206	 211	 199	
V2	 111	 149	 215	 212	 198	
V3	 111	 181	 295	 249	 209	
 
Scénario		 2015	 2020	 2025	 2030	 2035	
R	 111	 128	 147	 157	 176	
V0	 111	 192	 220	 176	 162	
V1	 111	 192	 207	 168	 160	
V2	 111	 192	 209	 188	 156	
V3	 111	 211	 286	 228	 203	
 
	
Table	21:	Total	investment	excluding	energy(bn$)	
High oil prices Low oil prices 
Scénario		 2015	 2020	 2025	 2030	 2035	
R	 2577	 2546	 2515	 2501	 2485	
V0	 2577	 2541	 2476	 2469	 2483	
V1	 2577	 2542	 2482	 2477	 2489	
V2	 2577	 2539	 2473	 2476	 2490	
V3	 2577	 2507	 2393	 2439	 2479	
 
Scénario	 2015	 2020	 2025	 2030	 2035	
R	 2577	 2560	 2541	 2531	 2512	
V0	 2577	 2496	 2468	 2512	 2526	
V1	 2577	 2496	 2481	 2520	 2528	
V2	 2577	 2496	 2479	 2500	 2532	
V3	 2577	 2477	 2402	 2460	 2485	
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6. Energy-intensive industry 
 
Table	22:	Production	prices	evolution	
High oil prices Low oil prices 
Scénario		 2015	 2020	 2025	 2030	 2035	
R	 0.861	 0.903	 0.92	 0.952	 0.966	
V0	 0.86	 0.91	 0.93	 0.965	 1.00	
V1	 0.862	 0.897	 0.913	 0.945	 0.98	
V2	 0.862	 0.896	 0.912	 0.942	 0.97	
V3	 0.869	 0.904	 0.91	 0.929	 0.91	
 
Scénario		 2015	 2020	 2025	 2030	 2035	
R	 0.826	 0.848	 0.853	 0.886	 0.906	
V0	 0.829	 0.886	 0.89	 0.921	 0.95	
V1	 0.829	 0.879	 0.875	 0.9	 0.936	
V2	 0.829	 0.867	 0.871	 0.894	 0.926	
V3	 0.826	 0.872	 0.868	 0.901	 0.91	
 
 
7. Non-energy intensive industry 
	
Table	23:	Production	prices	evolution	
High oil prices Low oil prices 
Scénario		 2015	 2020	 2025	 2030	 2035	
R	 0.856	 0.875	 0.88	 0.906	 0.919	
V0	 0.855	 0.873	 0.872	 0.891	 0.893	
V1	 0.855	 0.867	 0.862	 0.880	 0.881	
V2	 0.855	 0.866	 0.857	 0.873	 0.869	
V3	 0.850	 0.828	 0.803	 0.799	 0.713	
 
Scénario		 2015	 2020	 2025	 2030	 2035	
R	 0.841	 0.852	 0.855	 0.89	 0.919	
V0	 0.837	 0.809	 0.838	 0.882	 0.882	
V1	 0.837	 0.805	 0.83	 0.874	 0.881	
V2	 0.837	 0.792	 0.814	 0.867	 0.872	
V3	 0.841	 0.76	 0.753	 0.805	 0.786	
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Box 1: From SVMAs to the per ton guaranty 
The	notion	of	Social	Value	of	Mitigation	Activities	result	from	a	scientific	and	diplomatic	process	that	led	to	the	adoption	of	
the	Paragraph	108	of	 the	decision	of	 the	P.A.	where	Parties	 recognize	 ‘the	social,	 economic	and	environmental	value	of	
mitigation	actions	and	their	co-benefits	to	adaption,	health	and	sustainable	development’.	This	definition	translates	that	
the	 shared	objective	of	 the	 international	 community	 is	 to	 align	 climate	policies	with	 an	 equitable	 access	 to	 sustainable	
development	(see	sections	on	SVM	in	the	Stern-Stiglitz	report	on	carbon	pricing).		
The	 valuation	 of	 both	 the	 carbon	 component	 and	 the	 co-bene	 t	 component	 of	 the	 SVM	will	 fall	 necessarily	 within	 the	
competences	of	each	country	since	 it	will	express	 its	willingness	and	capacity	 to	pay.	For	 India	 for	example	Shukla	et	al.	
assess	 a	 SVM	of	 20$	 in	2020	 reaching	70$	 in	2040	whereas	 the	applicable	 carbon	prices	would	be	only	 3$	 in	2020	and	
18$	in	2040	in	2040	(Shukla	et	al	2011).	Such	differences	exist	within	the	EU	countries	at	a	far	lower	extent.	The	key	issue	
is	 whether	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 agree	 on	 an	 identical	 value	 for	 all	 cross	 borders	 investments	 that	 would	 represent	 the	
necessarily	higher	willingness	and	capacity	of	 the	 international	community	 to	pay	 for	 the	2°C	target.	 If	we	set	aside	 the	
international	 co-benefits	of	 reaching	this	 target,	 this	value	can	be	calculated	on	the	basis	of	 the	 trajectories	of	marginal	
costs	of	 carbon	derived	 from	 the	900	scenarios	registered	by	 the	 last	 IPCC	 report	 (IPCC	2014).	There	 is	a	wide	 range	of	
costs	 but	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 low	 and	 high	 bounds	 of	 the	 maximum	 likelihood	 corridors	 of	 the	 database,	
corresponding	of	different	degree	of	technological	optimism	is	not	that	wide.	It	could	be	reduced,	to	a	range	far	below	1	to	
2,	by	putting	out	this	data	base	those	scenarios	that	are	purely	exploratory	in	nature.		
The	calibration	of	the	support	to	a	project	per	ton	of	avoided	emission,	the	Social	Value	of	Mitigation	Activities,	is	the	pre-	
sent	value	of	the	retained	SVM	trajectory	and	depends	on	the	discount	rate	and	of	the	lifetime	of	the	project.	Table	1	gives	
the	results	for	contrasted	5%	and	2%	public	discount	rates.		
 
What	 is	 remarkable	 is	 that,	 even	 with	 a	 high	 5%	 discount	 rate,	 the	 long	 life	 projects	 are	 not	 that	 much	 penalized	 if	
compared	with	 short	 life	projects.	 They	 even	 receive	 a	higher	 support	per	 ton	with	 a	2%	discount	 rate.	 This	 is	why	 the	
calibration	of	 the	guarantees	on	the	SVM	allows	for	recognizing	the	value	of	long	term	investments	and	pave	the	way	to	
their	recognition	as	long	term	assets		
Ultimately	an	agreement	about	the	SVM	trajectory	and	the	discount	rate	will	be	political	in	nature.	It	should	be	easier	that	
around	a	price	of	carbon	because	a	VSM	does	not	hurt	existing	capital	stock	and	serves	as	a	rule	for	the	organization	of	a	
new	 financial	 facility	 supporting	new	 investments.	Moreover	 it	 could	be	 revised	 every	 three	 to	 five	 years	 in	 function	of	
new	information	and	of	the	experience	of	the	incentivizing	power	of	the	system.  
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Box 2: From de-risking low carbon investments to the generation of low carbon 
assets: a framing note 
Different	ways	of	scaling	up	climate	finance	have	been	envisaged	over	the	recent	years.	The	G20	asked	the	Financial	Stability	
Board	 (FSB),	 presided	over	by	 Bank	of	 England	 governor	Mark	Carney,	 to	 investigate	 the	possibility	of	 voluntarily	 disclosing	
climate-related	financial	risks	in	portfolios.	However,	although	disclosure	can	incite	the	financial	intermediaries	to	refrain	from	
investing	in	fossil-based	energies,	it	is	unsure	indeed	that	the	funds	will	be	invested	in	low	carbon	infrastructures.	
	
To	 trigger	 a	wave	 of	 low	 carbon	 investments	 demands	 aligning	 two	movements:	 de-risking	 of	 low-carbon	 investments	 and	
redirecting	 the	 global	 savings	 managed	 by	 institutional	 investors,	 investment	 banks,	 sub-sovereigns,	 industry	 and	 local	
communities.	A	prerequisite	 to	do	so	 in	 the	generation	of	 long-term	 low	carbon	assets	 that	are	secure	and	 liquid	enough	to	
attract	bond	markets	with	LCIs	at	low	interest	rates.	The	graph	below	sketches	the	basic	principles	to	generate	such	‘Climate	
Remediation	Assets’.		
	
(i) The	European	Union	and	each	of	its	Member	State,	unilaterally	or	together	with	non-EU	countries,	adopts	a	SVMA	
trajectory	 to	calibrate	sovereign	and	sub-sovereign	guarantees	for	low	carbon	investments	in	proportion	of	 their	
expected	avoided	emissions	of	GHGs	as	certified	by	independent	Third-Party	auditors.	
	
(ii) The	loans	get	through	this	guarantee	can	be	repaid	to	the	lender	(an	investment	bank	for	example)	either	in	‘cash’	
if	 the	 project	 is	 fully	 successful,	 or	 through	 “carbon	 remediation	 assets»	 that	 testify	 effective	 carbon	 emission	
reduction	after	due	control	by	an	independent	Third	Party.		
	
(iii) Banks	or	specialized	climate	funds	can	use	this	carbon-based	facility	to	back	highly	rated	climate	bonds,	in	order	to	
attract	institutional	investors	interested	in	safe	and	sustainable	assets.	
	
(iv) Since	public	statutory	guarantees	are	given	to	the	CRAs,	the	Central	Banks	of	each	country	will	accept	them	as	a	
repayment	of	 the	 liquidity	 they	give	to	 the	 commercial,	 industrial	and	development	banks	 to	 fund	 the	LCIs.	The	
CRAs	then	enter	the	central	bank’s	balance	sheet.	
	
This	 is	 tantamount	 injecting	 liquidities	 into	 the	economy	but,	contrary	 to	 the	 conventional	quantitative	easing	policies,	with	
low-carbon	investments	as	collateral.	The	CRAs	could	then	be	recognized	in	interbank	payments.	 In	summary,	de-risking	LCIs	
and	re-directing	savings	at	the	needed	scale	is	tantamount	to	issue	a	carbon-based	money.	The	central	banks	buy	a	service	of	
carbon	emission	reduction	at	a	price	justified	by	society’s	willingness	to	pay	for	a	better	climate.	Carbon-based	liquidities	can	
be	 therefore	 be	 considered	 as	 «equity	 in	 the	 commonwealth».	 The	 equity	 pays	 dividends	 in	 the	 form	 of	 «actual	 wealth»	
created	by	productive	low	carbon	investments	and	averted	emissions	in	the	short	term,	a	stronger	resilience	of	the	economy	
to	environmental	and	financial	shocks	in	the	longer	term.	
The	key	elements	of	a	climate-friendly	financial	architecture	
	
A	 more	 detailed	 examination	 of	 this	 mechanism	 can	 be	 found	 in	 Hourcade,	 J-C.,	 Aglietta,	 M.,	 Perissin-Fabert,	 B.,	 2014.	
Transition	 to	 a	 low-carbon	 society	 and	 sustainable	 economic	 recovery,	 A	 monetary-based	 financial	 device,	 Concept	 Note,	
CIRED-CEPII-CDCclimat-EPE	
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